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INTRODUCTION
The dominant discourse about poverty and racism has changed sig-
nificantly in the past decade to reflect a view that poverty, problems
attendant to poverty, and racial affiliation are matters of individual choice
that have individualized solutions. In this discourse, poverty, homelessness,
child neglect, and economically blighted and isolated communities reflect
personal pathology; White supremacy is a relic and all race distinctions are
bad. These beliefs are manifested in federal legislation that limits welfare
benefits, promotes adoption of poor children, and removes barriers to
transracial adoption. A common denominator of this legislation is the
notion that poor (Black) families are pathological so they should be dis-
couraged from having children and the children that they do have would
be better off with other parents.
Randall Kennedy's Interracial Intimacies' is an example of this ap-
proach. The book cloaks itself in the vestments of racial liberty while
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law; B.A. 1982, Cornell University;
J.D. 1996, Northwestern University School of Law. I wish to thank my wonderful col-
leagues Joan Howarth, Kate Kruse, and Carl Tobias for helpful comments on earlier drafts,
Nancy Heimerle for her thoughtful and diligent research assistance, and the James E.
Rogers Faculty Enrichment Fund for providing research support.
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promoting individualized blame and solutions for racial oppression. The
book, ambitious in scope, if not depth, makes a vivid case for the arbi-
trariness and destructiveness of racial classifications through the tales of
interracial couples, families, and the social and legal responses to them.2
For Kennedy, intimate interracial relations are sites of civil rights and ra-
cial justice, private yet publicly opposed. Kennedy seeks to demonstrate
through stories of barriers to interracial adult relationships, the rejection
of Black children from White communities, and challenges to Black or
interracial parenting of White children, that race should never matter in
intimate relationships, and further that the government should promote
adoption of children of color by White parents. Although the stories
stand on their own as striking examples of the absurdity and contingency
of racial assignment, the rather thin and thinly developed unifying theory,
that removing barriers to interracial intimacy promotes racial justice,
masks important distinctions between personal choice and socio-material
conditions affecting that choice, relationships between adults and between
adults and children, and, finally, what it means to be White and Black in
the United States.
Kennedy's vision of racial justice is one in which individuals may
choose freely with whom to be intimate, including the intimacy of raising
children. He aspires to a world in which racial distinctions do not exist,
and he acknowledges that legal barriers to adult interracial intimacies,
much of the book's focus, have been abolished.3 Kennedy asserts those
barriers remain in child rearing, most notably in the adoption field.4 Yet
his promotion of race neutrality in this field seems to promote White as-
similationist goals, rather than racial justice, because he views White
adoption of Black foster children as the solution to Black family dysfunc-
tion.' Kennedy does not appreciate, or seem to care, that his "solution"
devalues Black families. He fails to differentiate between the reason for
barriers to adult interracial relationships (the maintenance of White su-
premacy) and the reason for self-imposed separatism of nondominant
cultural, religious, and racial groups (to preserve their identities against the
hegemony of the dominant culture). Moreover, he does not take suffi-
cient account of the experiences of the children for whom he proposes
1. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION (2003).
2. With the exception of a chapter on the Indian Child Welfare Act, Kennedy
confines his discussion almost exclusively to Black and White "races." I do not take issue
with the narrow scope because there certainly is very much material on the subject. A
different book that was more interested in the complexity of race and the context of in-
terracial intimacies would have sacrificed the volume and specificity of Black-White
relationships reviewed in Interracial Intimacies, but would perhaps be richer. See, e.g.,
RACHEL F MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY:THE REGULATION OF RACE & ROMANCE (2001).
3. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 35.
4. Id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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the solution. While Kennedy seems to ignore larger social structures in
which his individualized solution sits, his solution threatens diversity and
promotes homogenization in the context of intimate relations between
parents and children where culture is created and reproduced. Thus, what
first appears a rather noncontroversial book about free choice in intimate
relationships actually embraces social policies that promote the permanent
removal of poor Black children from their families and adoption of these
same children by White parents.
This book review addresses the meaning of purported race neutral-
ity in the context of child rearing and other intimate relationships6 and
the analytic weakness, particularly in the family context, of Kennedy's
overall disregard of child development, gender, and class. In Section I, I
describe Kennedy's book and methodology to afford a sense of his ap-
proach to, and organization of, the subject. In Section II, I respond to
Kennedy's methodology, premises, and arguments by placing intimacy in
the contexts of youth, race, class, and gender. I address and critique his
assumption that the private family law paradigm of adult choice and pa-
rental decision-making apply to family law systems like slavery and child
welfare, which are characterized by coercive state intervention into inti-
mate adult choices relating to marriage and child rearing. I show that
Kennedy's similar failure to consider the differences in autonomy of adults
and children causes him to overlook the special experiences of adoptees
that frequently connect them to multiple families, races, and culture in
ways that matter for adoptees' growth and identity formation. I turn next
to an exploration of how consideration of children's interests and experi-
ences would inform Kennedy's approach to transracial adoption. I then
show how the failure to view foster children and their families in their
own context leads to Kennedy's adult-centered approach to transracial
adoption. Finally, I trace how Kennedy's promotion of transracial adop-
tion as a solution to foster care matches conservative, and approaches
White-supremacist, ideas and policies (such as recent welfare and child
welfare reforms) designed to provide barriers to child rearing by poor
Black parents and promote child rearing by White middle-class families.
6. 1 do not take on race neutrality as a general matter.There is already a rich litera-
ture that criticizes race neutrality. For a recent, succinct critique of race neutrality, see Part
I of Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2442-45
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., HAwLEY FOGG-DAvis, THE ETHICS OF TRAN's-
RACIAL ADOPTION (2002); Pichard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative
Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711 (1995); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991); Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of
Inequality, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1753 (2001); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HAv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Genetic Tie, 62 U. CH. L. Rev. 209 (1995);Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum
and the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995).
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I. KENNEDY'S CASE FOR ACHIEVING RACIAL
JUSTICE THROUGH INTERRACIAL INTIMACY
Interracial Intimacies is really two books in structure and substance.
The first part attends to adult relationships from slavery through modern
times.7 The second part addresses parent-child relationships.8 Interracial
Intimacies is also two books in terms of approach. The primary approach is
a presentation of a series of topically and chronologically arranged vi-
gnettes that illustrate adult interracial relationships and social and legal
responses to them, with some commentary. The other approach is pre-
scriptive, assessing and recommending social policy, chiefly around
transracial adoption. I present, in the following subsections, a summary of
the book mirroring its structure rather than providing a more analytic or
thematic approach; I choose this course so the reader can obtain a sense of
the book's methodology.
A. The Opening Paradigm
The book opens with the narrative of the familiar, rich, and ironic
story ofJacqueline Henley' It is a compelling story of forbidden interracial
adult intimacy, the arbitrary assignment of race to biracial children, and
barriers to parenting across racial lines. Kennedy uses it as a paradigm for
the wrongs of racial assignment to, and distribution of, children.
Jacqueline was a biracial girl born in New Orleans in 1950 to a poor
White woman who became terminally ill shortly after Jacqueline's birth."0
Jacqueline was legally White, but dark-skinned and, as a result, spent much
of her childhood caught between rigid racial categories that kept her
from living in the then relatively separate Black or White worlds.
Jacqueline's appearance made it difficult to remain with her White aunt,
but because her birth certificate identified her as White, she could not,
despite her appearance, be adopted by her Black foster parents. Although
her foster parents sought to change her birth certificate to identify her as
Black, the county clerk, Jacqueline's guardian ad litem, and, ultimately, a
judge refused to allow the modification because it was in Jacqueline's best
interests to maintain the privilege of White racial status." Eventually,
Jacqueline was shipped to Chicago to be adopted by a prominent Black
7. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 3-366.
8. See id. at 367-521.
9. Although familiar, Kennedy enriches our knowledge of the story with inter-
views of the people involved and quotes from the original record. Id. at 3-12, 37-38.
10. Id. at3.
11. Id. at 5-12.
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family and her foster parents traveled to Oregon where they adopted a
biracial Korean-Black boy.1
2
Jacqueline's adoption journey vividly illustrates the contingency of
race and the destructiveness of legally defined and imposed racial classifi-
cations that thwart the private ordering of families: in this case, the choice
of adults to adopt a child-and, perhaps, the marriage of Jacqueline's
White mother and Black father. Jacqueline's story is also an example of
the interference of racial classifications with the placement of a literally
motherless child, first with a loving White aunt, and second with a loving
Black foster family. Kennedy appears to view Jacqueline's story as para-
digmatic of harmful race-based barriers to intimate ordering.
Yet by the end of the book the contents of the paradigm have
switched markedly: the orphans1 3 are Black foster children (many of
whom actually have parents), the thwarted adoptive parents are White
adults who seek to adopt Black children, and the protectors of the best
interests of the child are misguided social workers who believe Black
children belong with Black parents so to honor Black experience and
culture. While Jacqueline's story shares some of the formalistic racial bar-
riers relating to adoption of foster children today, it has little in common
with the dynamics of the current transracial adoption debate. For, while
legal and social barriers kept Jacqueline from remaining with her Black
foster parents, current law and policy promote both coercive separation of
children from their Black parents and placement with White foster and
adoptive parents. 4 The predominant threat to racial justice today is not
that Black families cannot adopt White (or biracial) children but that the
State removes Black (or biracial) children from their Black parents and
places them with White families." Ironically, like the county clerk, judge,
and guardian ad litem in Jacqueline's story, Kennedy also seems to aspire
to White racial privilege for Black foster children.
B. Adult Relationships
The adult relationships part of the book has two different organiza-
tional structures: the first provides a chronological overview of adult
interracial relationships during slavery, Reconstruction, the Civil Rights
Movement, and up to the present; and, the second provides a series of
thematic views, highlighting the negative aspects of these intimacies such
as sexual coercion, lynching, and racial passing. 6 Both the chronological
12. Id. at 37-38.
13. Later in the book, Kennedy refers to Black foster children as "parentless." See,
e.g., infra text accompanying notes 72 and 92.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 130, 134-45.
15. See infa text accompanying notes 146-50.
16. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 41-366.
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and thematic portions present interracial relationships through stories,
lawsuits, and popular media.'7 These stories are informative, extremely
moving, and sometimes ugly. Here, Kennedy seems most concerned with
making a case for dismantling any treatment that subordinates Black indi-
vidual choice to White and Black community interests or norms.'
8
According to Kennedy, during slavery, interracial coupling was
commonplace and more tolerated than the heightened de jure White su-
premacy of the times would suggest. 19 These relationships, often
"consensual," occurred between White men and free or enslaved Black
women, and free or enslaved Black men and White women.2 ° The off-
spring of many of these unions formed much of the free Black
community.2' The free Black community was mainly composed of free-
born or later-freed adult children of White women and Black men, or
masters and enslaved women, respectively.
22
During Reconstruction, interracial intimacies occurred, but were
less tolerated and probably less frequent than during slavery.23 Interracial
intimacies continued to be sparse during the first half of the twentieth
century.24 After World War II, interracial taboos loosened as Blacks mi-
grated from the South to the North, Black veterans returned home, and
Hider's fascism caused some uneasy examination of our own history of race
relations.2 The Civil Rights Movement created shared space and purpose
for Blacks and Whites and created opportunity for, and approval of, interra-
cial intimacy 26 Kennedy marks 1967 as a pivotal year for widespread
acceptance of interracial intimacy because of the release of the film Guess
Who's Coming to Dinner?, the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia7
which held anti-miscegenation laws are unconstitutional, and the Time
cover story of the interracial marriage of Guy Smith and Peggy Rusk.2"
Following this watershed year, there was much greater acceptance of inter-
17. The relationships presented are primarily, though not exclusively, Black-White
and heterosexual.
18. Kennedy seems to be fighting against an unnamed enemy-Black community
condemnation of interracial intimacy, see id. at 331-32, although much of this portion of
the book is aimed at dominant culture's historic disapprobation. That the enemy is Black
becomes clear in the parent-child relationships portion when he criticizes the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) and other proponents of race matching
and cultural competence in transracial adoption. See id. at 393-98.
19. Id. at 66-69.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id. at 70-85.
24. Id. at 85-92.
25. Id. at 98-100.
26. Id. at 100-04.
27. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 104-08.
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racial intimacy mixed, however, with some opposition from Blacks who
resisted assimilation. 2 Ultimately, interracial intimacy gave birth to multi-
racial movements and amalgamation as a method to achieve racial
justice.3"
After this chronological overview, Kennedy examines some of the
negative sides of interracial intimacies, including sexual coercion, demoni-
zation of Black male sexuality, and anti-miscegenation laws. He also
examines racial passing, which he views as subversively positive. Kennedy
begins this thematic portion with a series of narratives of relationships
between slave masters and slave women. Kennedy notes the inherent co-
ercion of master and female slave coupling and rape, as well as Black male
slaves' inability to protect their wives, lovers, sisters, and mothers during
slavery.3' He argues these dynamics continue to cast a symbolic shadow on
White male/Black female relationships. 32 He next turns to the demoniza-
tion of Black male sexuality and to Black male sexual coercion, Kennedy's
sometime euphemism for rape,33 ofWhite (and Black) women?' He con-
cludes that such Black male sexual coercion-the very fact that some
Black men have the power to rape White women-illustrates that Black
men have the requisite power to be racist and exercise racism.3"
Kennedy also addresses anti-miscegenation laws, including the en-
forcement of the laws, 36 the campaign against them, and the United States
Supreme Court's outlaw of them in Loving v. Virginia.37 Kennedy notes the
NAACP's strategic decision not to contest anti-miscegenation laws earlier
in the civil rights litigation movement because interracial intimacy was so
intimate and, therefore, threatening. 38 It is not clear what, if any, new
29. Id. at 109-23.
30. Id. at 157.
31. See id. at 163-80. Kennedy does not mention how mothers felt about being
unable to protect their daughters. See id. at 167 (noting that in failing "to criminalize sex-
ual coercions of bondswomen, the slave regime not only increased female slaves'
vulnerability to sexual assault but also put enslaved men in a terrible bind" of being unable
to protect their womenfolk).
32. Id. at 180-82.
33. Oddly, Kennedy uses the phrase "sexual coercion" and sometimes "sexual ex-
ploitation" rather than "rape." See id. at 162-213. Although he does mention the "rape" of
a slave at least once. Id. at 172. Kennedy also refers to at least one master's sexual relations
with slaves as "sexual dalliances." Id. at 165. It seems odd to neutralize the "sexual rela-
tions" between slave and master during a period of de jure White male supremacy that
produced the most extreme power imbalance and terror. Perhaps he chooses these vague,
soft terms because the hedonistic experiences of the women are difficult to ascertain or
perhaps he hopes to minimize the symbolism of rape that serves as a barrier to present day
interracial intimacy between White men and Black women. See id. at 162,167, 180.
34. Id. at 183-213.
35. Id. at 207-13.
36. Id. at 214-43.
37. Id. at 244-80.
38. Id. at 257.
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ground Kennedy covers, but his description provides an interesting his-
tory.
The thematic portion of the book concludes with a discussion of
racial passing 59-- the conscious attempt of a "Black" person4 ° to conceal or
fail to disclose Black ancestry." It is, perhaps, an unarticulated bridge to
the parent-child portion of the book because passing relates to the prod-
uct of interracial adult intimacies-offspring who can "pass" as White or
Black, and because passing, like transracial adoption, symbolizes to him a
break with both White- and Black-imposed racial orthodoxies. These
chapters are mostly descriptive, presenting a series of fictional and nonfic-
tional stories about racial passing. Although Kennedy recognizes how
racial passing has reinforced "racial lines of exclusion "' 42 he, like others,
also views passing as "a challenge to racist regimes."4 Passing today, Ken-
nedy notes, could be construed to include all forms of interracial
intimacy-interracial marriage, transracial adoption, and identifying as
multiracial. 4 A "liberal individualist," Kennedy supports these types of
passing4 and opposes identity politics and racial distinctions drawn by
Whites and Blacks.4 6 Instead, he "yearns for a society in which race has
become obsolete as a significant social marker.
'
"
4 7
Although Kennedy seeks racial equality or justice through interra-
cial intimacies, he does not explain how such intimate relationships will
move us there. Social theory has long assumed that intermarriages are
markers of assimilation and greater racial equality,48 but Kennedy does not
cite any studies establishing either that connection or how interracial
coupling creates racial equality. Studies do show that interracial marriage
is more prevalent in geographic and economic areas where racial divisions
are not as pronounced 9 and that interracial couples may have more toler-
39. See id. at 281-366.
40. Under White supremacy, this refers to someone who had any Black ancestry. Id.
at 284. Despite this definition, Kennedy does discuss Whites passing as Blacks. See id. at
333-38.
41. Id. at 285.
42. Id. at 318.
43. Id. at 319.
44. Id. at 331.
45. Id. at 332.
46. Id. at 331-33.
47. Id. at 332.
48. See Yanick St.Jean, Let People Speak for Themselves: Interracial Unions and the Gen-
eral Social Survey, 28 J. BLACK SruD. 398, 398-99 (1998); Sheryline A. Zebroski, Black- White
Intermarriages: The Racial and Gender Dynamics of Support and Opposition, 30 J. BLACK STUD.,
123, 123 (1999).
49. See Matthijs Kalmijn, Trends in Black/White Intermarriage, 72 Soc. FoRcEs 119,
141 (1993); see also M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, New Trends in Black
American Interracial Marriage: The Social Structural Context, 52 J. MARIAGE & FAM. 209, 209
(1990) (interracial marriage rates vary greatly by region, are substantially higher in the
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ant friends and neighbors."0 Thus, it may be that tolerance begets interra-
cial intimacy, rather than that interracial intimacy produces tolerance.
Moreover, interracial couples experience race differently, in part, than in-
traracial couples.' Although more aware of race than they may have been
before the marriage,12 interracial couples "speak of their own colorblind-
ness and share experiences that ... have positively contributed to their
choice of mate."' 3 These are areas Kennedy did not explore, but could
inform his theory regarding the relationship between interracial intimacy,
eradication of racial assignment, and racial justice.
C. Parent- Child Relationships
The second part of the book is about interracial parent-child rela-
tionships. It is different in tone and organization from the first part in that
Kennedy clearly has a present and future-oriented agenda-the removal
of any barriers to transracial adoption. This part of the book is more topi-
cal and less chronological although it presents the material, much like in
the first part of the book, through a series of anecdotes derived from case
law, Congressional testimony, memoirs, and other narratives. Although
Kennedy addresses the use of race in private custody disputes, his primary
focus and concern appear to be limitations on transracial adoption. For
Kennedy, such limitations interfere with interracial intimacy and perpetu-
ate racial stereotyping and "permanent racial identity"'" just as internal
and external social, legal, and cultural forces do in adult intimate relation-
ships.
Kennedy begins this portion of the book by recalling Jacqueline
Henley and the designation of right and wrong races to parent children.5
This designation reminds him of the problematization of interracial
West, and are most prevalent in more racially tolerant areas). Most intermarriage occurs
among the middle-class and poor Blacks remain isolated economically and geographically
from Whites. Kalmijn, supra, at 142.
50. See also Zebroski, supra note 48, at 124 ("There may even be a tendency on the
part of interracial couples to actively seek supportive social situations and avoid those that
are not, in order to live ordinary lives .... "). Indeed, interracial couples report horrible,
disapproving comments from family, friends, and strangers. See, e.g., St. Jean, supra note 48,
at 405-06, 408-09.
51. Miriam R. Hill &Volker Thomas, Strategies for Racial Identity Development: Narra-
tives of Black and White Women in Interracial Partner Relationships, 49 FAM. REL. 193 (2000).
Moreover, in some ways, it appears that interracial couples become raced. They are not
just a couple, but an interracial couple, who may be guarded when in public. See id. at
196-98; St.Jean, supra note 48, at 404-12 (both reporting interracial couples experiencing
racist comments and constraints at work, with families, and in public).
52. St. Jean, supra note 48, at 409-11.
53. Id. at 409.
54. KNNEDY, supra note 1, at 367.
55. Id.
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parenting manifested both when White women, impregnated by Black
slaves, killed their babies to destroy the evidence of interracial sex and
the legal assignment of color and slave status to biracial children born to
female slaves.5 6  For Kennedy, these extreme examples of racial
assignment and boundaries are echoed in modern custodial and
adoptive race matching. 7
With this introduction, Kennedy launches an examination of
"blocked interracial parenting" 8 in which community norms, individual
choice, or judges use race to dictate custody. To reveal the arbitrariness of
these racial assignments, Kennedy presents a series of stories of biracial
children who were classified as White or Black depending on how the
community identified them at any given time.5 9 Kennedy then shares sev-
eral stories illustrating utilization of race in custody determinations
regarding children in divorces. 60 All of these stories exhibit the social con-
struction of race, specifically White supremacy, in which biracial children
are assigned to the Black race and White children are removed from inter-
racial couples. Kennedy concludes this portion with a discussion of
Palmore v. Sidoti,61 in which the United States Supreme Court outlawed
the use of race in custody decisions. 62 Although Kennedy views Palmore as
a positive decision that outlaws both benign and hostile motive racial dis-
crimination in custody determinations, 63 he is troubled by the Court's
failure to explore the positive aspects of transracial custody.
64
Kennedy then turns his attention for the rest of the chapter, and the
book, to transracial adoption. This discussion begins with a somewhat
chronological rehearsal of approaches to transracial adoption, including
statutory prohibitions to transracial adoption in Louisiana and Texas and
criminal sanctions for placing White children with Black families in South
56. Id. at 367-68.
57. See id. at 367 (introducing the interracial parent-child relationship portion of
the book by recalling infanticide and racial assignment during the slavery era). Race
matching refers to social and political philosophies that promote placing adoptive children
with adoptive parents of the same race. The phrase appears to be neutral, but presently it
refers to social, psychological, and political theory that holds children of color should be
placed with parents of color.
58. Id. at 368, 370.
59. Id. at 368-72. For example, in the first decade of the twentieth century, one
child was passed around from Black to White to Black homes every time her race was
questioned. Id. at 368. In the 1940s, a biracial boy was placed with a Black family after
living for his first few years with his White mother and herWhite husband until she could
no longer conceal his race (and her adultery) from the neighbors and her husband; but the
little boy faced problems in his new home for being too light skinned and eventually be-
came involved in a life of crime and homicide. Id. at 368-70.
60. Id. at 372-86.
61. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
62. Id. at 380-86.
63. Id. at 386.
64. Id. at 383-84.
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Carolina. 6- He also describes one case in which a judge denied the adop-
tion of a White child by his Black stepfather because such an adoption
would legally and socially disadvantage the White child who would, by
virtue of the adoption, become Black.
6
Kennedy acknowledges, however, that the more dominant issue in
transracial adoption is the placing of Black children with White parents.
This is the bridge to his primary agenda, the abolition of race matching in
the adoption of children of color. Kennedy identifies and problematizes
two approaches to race matching, strong race matching and moderate race
matching. Strong race matching advocates "are willing to wait indefinitely,
if need be, to ensure that a [B]lack child is raised by a [B]lack adult.' 67 For
Kennedy, the 1972 National Association of Black Social Workers
(NABSW) statement against placing Black children with White families,6
exemplifies the strong race matching preference. He characterizes the two
arguments in favor of strong race matching as the promotion of what is
best for Blacks as a group and what is best for individual Black children. 9
Moderate race matching, on the other hand, permits transracial adoption
but only after substantial efforts to find same-race placements have
failed. 70
Kennedy's thesis is that all race matching is destructive and interferes
with the adoption of Black children; or, put more positively, transracial
adoption is both good for children and for race relations.71 His thesis is
directed at, and he believes, supported by the needs of, Black foster chil-
dren. To him, as well as his colleague Elizabeth Bartholet, foster children
are nobody's children-they are "parentless. 7 2 Kennedy notes the dispro-
portionate percentage of Black children in foster care 73 and simply
attributes it, without support, to parental fault caused by "a long and bitter
history of slavery, segregation, and racially selective neglect and mistreat-
ment" and the private preferences of adoptive parents who prefer White
children.7 4
With these matters asserted, Kennedy presents his arguments sup-
porting transracial adoption of foster children. Transracial adoption has
65. Id. at 386-401.
66. Id. at 390-92.
67. Id. at 398.
68. Id. at 393.
69. Id. at 395.
70. Id. at 399.
71. Id. at 402.
72. Id. at 402; see ELIzABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999). For an analysis and critique of this
book, see Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716 (2000).
73. His term is "parentless children." KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 402.
74. Id. at 402-03.
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been studied and debated for decades and Kennedy offers little new. For
Kennedy, transracial adoption is the primary solution to foster care, which
in turn is the solution to caring for the children of the hundreds of thou-
sands of Black parents so unfit that they are not "parents. 75 His basic
positive argument is that since there are more Black foster children than
prospective Black adoptive parents, it is not possible to race match.7 6 Thus,
race matching "likely contributes to" the large percentage of Black chil-
dren languishing in foster care by both delaying permanent placement for
Black children and discouraging White people from coming forward to
adopt Black foster children."
Kennedy presents a race neutral equal protection argument that race
matching is discriminatory and cannot meet heightened scrutiny.7 In this
context, he assesses and refutes arguments in favor of race matching.7 9
These arguments, according to Kennedy, are that: Black adults are better
able to parent Black children because they have experienced racial dis-
crimination;8 ° Black parents can teach Black children survival skills in a
racist world;8 ' and, transracial adoption is bad for Blacks as a group be-
cause it suggests that they cannot care for their own. 2 Kennedy's answers
to those arguments are: White people have experienced prejudice and if
they have not, then they can learn about it and their stand against racism
will be more powerful because they are White;8 3 Blacks' experience of
75. See id. at 402, 406, 496. Apparently, Kennedy is unfamiliar with or unsympa-
thetic to the vast literature regarding causes of the disproportionate entry into and slow
exit from foster care of Black children and other children of color, most notably Indian.
See infra text accompanying notes 134-143. Kennedy is also skeptical about the parenting
ability of Black foster and adoptive parents. He bemoans "political pressures" to recruit
more Black foster and adoptive parents that have led to inferior foster and adoptive homes
"that are little better and sometimes worse than their homes of origin." KENNEDY, supra
note 1, at 406 (citing newspaper stories about bad foster parents).
76. Id. at 403. Others claim there are sufficient Black families willing and able to
adopt. E.g., Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n & Carla Bradley, Race and Transracial Adoption: The
Answer is Neither Simply Black or White Nor Right or Wrong, 51 CATH. U. L. Rav. 1227, 1260
(2002).
77. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 404. Kennedy cites a student note for this proposition
but offers no page citation. Id. at 404 n.7, citing Amanda T. Perez, Note, Transracial Adoption
and the Federal Adoption Subsidy, 17 YA.E L. & PoL'Y REV. 201 (1998). The lack of a pin-
point citation is understandable since nowhere does the note establish what effect, if any,
race matching has on the large numbers of Black children in foster care. The note does,
however, contain several assertions regarding disproportionate numbers of Black children
in foster care, the willingness of 68,000 White parents to consider adopting transracially,
and some social workers' preferences for race matching. Id. at 204-06,205 n.17.
78. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 406-07.
79. Id. at 406-11.
80. Id. at 407-09.
81. Id. at 409.
82. Id. at 410.
83. Id. at 407-09.
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victimization does not necessarily make them better teachers of survival
skills; on the contrary, many Blacks can internalize racism and teach their
children "Negrophobic attitudes;"84 and, it is politically important to have
responsibility for Black children shared by all races, but even if not, the
needs of individual children should not be subordinate to political needs
of the group."5
Kennedy also takes on the notion of cultural competency assessment
and training, a social work practice designed to ensure that adoptive par-
ents, particularly in transracial adoptions, can understand, and respond to,
the differences between their own cultural experiences and those of their
adoptive child.8 6 He argues that cultural competency is too imprecise and
presumes both homogeneity within the Black community and cultural
competence of all Blacks." On the contrary, Kennedy asserts that "there is
no proper authoritative criterion for grading the racial appropriateness of
parenting-only the very real specter of an imposition of orthodoxies
.... "88 It is no surprise then that Kennedy supports the Removal of Bar-
riers to Interethnic Adoption Act (IAA),89 a federal law that prohibits any
consideration of race by adoption agencies receiving federal funds.90
After presenting his arguments in favor of transracial adoption,
Kennedy returns to the style that dominated the portion of the book
about adult interracial intimacies, a collection of selected personal stories,
primarily narratives.9' His theme is that White transracial adoptive parents
84. Id. at 409.
85. Id. at 410-11. Kennedy also likens race matching to racial profiling by police,
employer preferences for White employees based on assumptions of superior qualifications
ofWhites, and other generalizations about race, such as White communities are prejudiced
against Blacks. Id. at 412-15. Later, in an apparent effort to distinguish himself from the
similarities between opposition to race matching and to affirmative action, he distinguishes
the two practices because affirmative action is a remedy for past discrimination whereas
race matching has no sufficient grounds for racial distinction. Id. at 427-28. He would,
nevertheless, support "dismantling affirmative action [if it] must be part of the price of
effectively doing away with race matching." Id. at 428.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 181-90 (defining and discussing cultural
competence).
87. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 444-46. Ironically, Kennedy wants proof that Black
parents are better able to parent Black children, id. at 407-10, but he criticizes such as-
sessment of'White parents, id. at 416-17.
88. Id. at 446.
89. Passed as Section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5§ 671, 674,
1996b (2000)).
90. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 418-33; see also text accompanying notes 215-21.
Kennedy believes it should be extended to private adoptions and adoption agencies as
well. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 433-34, but that adoptive parents should be able to choose
the race of their adoptive child as a matter of private personal choice, much like marriage,
id. at 435-36.
91. Id. at 447-79.
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are an "ostracized" minority considered by themselves and society to be
inferior to Black parents for rearing "parentless [B]lack children. 9 2
Kennedy begins the discussion with a positive history of transracial
adoption, a phenomenon that began slowly in the 1940s but picked up
during the 1960s and early 1970s as a part of the Civil Rights Movement
and then fell out of favor when the NABSW issued its position paper.93
He then turns to an examination of three memoirs by White transracial
adoptive parents.94 From these memoirs, he draws the lesson that White
adoptive parents have a false consciousness that overstates racism,
undervalues their own parenting abilities, and inflates the goodness of
Black people.95 Another lesson one could draw is that transracial adoptive
parenting is challenging, rewarding, and transformative, particularly
around race consciousness.
Kennedy also rehearses select voices of transracial adoptees, as told
through newspaper, book, and journal accounts.96 The adoptee narratives
exhibit the richness and complexity of identity for adoptees, the loyalty
toward, and love of, their adoptive parents, and the longing for connection
to their heritage. Although he acknowledges the importance of these
voices, he claims that transracial adoptees are pawns in the transracial
adoption battles. 97 While he notes that most of these adoptees feel there
should not be a ban on interracial adoptions, he admits that a "substantial
number" believe same race placements are preferable to transracial place-
ments.9" Kennedy then actually dismisses the adoptee narratives because
they conflict and there is, therefore, no true authority.99 Kennedy does not,
apparently, want to essentialize transracial adoptees.
Kennedy's final chapter,"° which appears to be an add-on, critiques
the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the federal statute that favors
custodial and adoptive placements of Indian children with Indians and
provides special procedural protections for Indian children, parents and
Indian custodians of Indian children, and Indian tribes.101 Here, he pre-
sents a slightly less myopic view of the plight of Indian children and
families than the one he presents regarding Black children and families.
92. Id. at 447, 448, 451. Apparently without irony, Kennedy seeks to refute the
"myths of [W]hite parental inferiority." Id. at 447.
93. Id. at 450-53.
94. Id. at 453-68.
95. Id. at 463-66. Kennedy nevertheless criticizes these parents for failing to take on
the NABSW and spread the word of the benefits of transracial adoption. Id. at 465-68.
96. Id. at 468-78.
97. Id. at 468-69.
98. Id. at 469.
99. Id. at 469, 476-77.
100. Id. at 480-518.
101. 25 U.S.C. % 1901-1963 (2000).
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According to Kennedy, the ICWA harms "needy" Indian children and
unfairly stigmatizes non-Indians adoptive parents."2
To Kennedy, however, the ICWA is not all bad. Its grant of author-
ity to Indian tribes over foster care and adoption decisions was positive
because it helped politically engage tribes and values Indian culture.
10 3
Kennedy also appears to approve of the ICWA's remedial purpose."°  At
the same time, the ICWA is bad because it permits "bad decisions by
judges" and was based on inaccurate data that pointed to discriminatory
official conduct regarding Indian families and "junk social science"''0
holding that Indian children suffer psychological damage when adopted
by non-Indians.1 6 The remainder of the chapter critiques the legislative
research on which the ICWA was based,' junk science used to support
the ICWA,"'° and incoherence of the ideology of cultural preservation.0 9
Kennedy also expresses approval of the existing Indian family doctrine
that courts have developed to limit the scope of the ICWA."0 Kennedy
concludes this discussion with a call for Congressional review of the
ICWA."'
102. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 480.
103. Id. at 487-88. Kennedy does not clarify how there can be Indian culture when
there is no such thing as Black culture.
104. Id. at 488.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 491-99. Kennedy suggests that he reviewed all of the legislative history;
including the testimony and data presented in hearings on earlier versions of the bill that
would become ICWA. Id. at 597 n.30. Nevertheless, he addresses most of his critique to
the House report accompanying ICWA or other materials not part of the extensive re-
cord. E.g., id., at 492-93, 494, 495. Kennedy neglected to mention the record's extensive
quantitative data, based largely on state government records, regarding out-of-home
placement of Indian children. See On Problems that American Indian Families Face in Raising
Their Children and How these Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction, 1974: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93rd
Cong. 40, 72-94 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings]; Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hear-
ing on S. 124 Before the US. Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 537-603
(1977). Nor did Kennedy note the testimony of psychiatry professors Drs. Carl Mindell
and Alan Gurwitt based on what appear to be qualitative studies of Indian children and
reservations. 1974 Hearings, supra, at 54-64. Moreover, Kennedy does not explain how the
methodologies of these or other reported research were flawed and he does not identify
scientific methodologies he supports and why.
108. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 499-504. According to Kennedy, the real problem was
not discrimination against Indian families, as the legislative history suggests, but instead the
pathology of Indian families and the underlying conditions of Indian life, such as poverty,
disease, and dysfunction. Id. at 498-99.
109. Id. at 512-15.
110. Id. at 510-11.
111. Id. at 516-18.
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D. Kennedy's Conclusions
Kennedy's Afterword '12 brings us back to Jacqueline Henley with the
curious assertion that the "United States is a far different place from-a
considerably better place than-the country into which Jacqueline Henley
was born."' 3 Kennedy does not indicate exactly how it is better. Pre-
sumably, he means that overt racism and constraints running along color
lines are subdued and that families are able to engage in private ordering
now that miscegenation is no longer illegal, parents of biracial children
can maintain their ties with their children, and there is greater acceptance
of transracial adoption. These changes bring us closer to his vision of "a
racially egalitarian society in which individuals may enjoy their freedoms
without racial constraint.""' 4 To promote this individualized racial free-
dom, Kennedy suggests three tasks to improve race relations in the sphere
of intimate association: 1) improve the material conditions of the poor
who are disproportionately of color so that they will have more choices
in selecting friends, partners, and spouses; 2) forbid the government from
engaging in routine race matching; and 3) on an individual level, refuse
"to embrace unthinkingly inherited habits and ... [instead] put into ac-
tion humane ideals." ' i
II. INTIMACY IN CONTEXT
Kennedy's tales of interracial intimacy, particularly on the adult-adult
level, are moving and at times deep. His book shows repeatedly that adult
interracial sexual relationships fundamentally challenge White supremacy
on multiple levels because of their intimacy."6 These relationships at once
cut to the core of racial separatism, challenge Whiteness (indeed the con-
cept of race), and reflect the value creation and propagation that rightly
places intimate relationships into a highly protected sphere. Kennedy's in-
sight regarding the importance of viewing intimate relationships as sites of
racial meaning is a good one. The notion that our romantic desires and
other intimate orderings are capable of both creating and reinforcing racial
difference and breaking down racial distinctions and hatred brings home,
112. See id. at 519-21.
113. Id. at 520.
114. Id. at 519.
115. Id. at 520-21.
116. Examples include the Civil Rights Movement's delay of challenging anti-
miscegenation laws because interracial intimacy was more threatening than integrated
education and the right to vote; early responses to biracial offspring in which parents
killed or communities ostracized biracial children, and; the use of segregation and other
rules to keep Black men away from White women. See also Roberts, supra note 6, at 223-
38 (exploring the role of White supremacy in legal rules relating to miscegenation and
parentage).
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so to speak, racial justice, and highlights the political implications of our
personal lives (and personal implications of our political lives). Kennedy
makes a good case for this idea, particularly in the first portion of his
book.
Unfortunately, Kennedy's attempt to tie together the various strands
and stories of the book is unsucessful. The book's muddy approach to the
topic-the combination of narrative, what appears to be a form of cultural
studies, and policy analysis-does not coalesce because the descriptive na-
ture of most of the book fails to provide the grounding for legal or policy
analysis. Kennedy seeks to use these stories to support social policy that has
drastic implications for hundreds of thousands of Black and Indian families
but does not mine the significant body of theoretical and empirical research
in multiple disciplines relating to the complicated and nuanced worlds of
foster care and adoption."7 A more systematic and analytic approach to
such heavily-studied areas as adoption and child welfare would provide a
much more legitimate base for the policies Kennedy advocates, if social
science does indeed support these policies. In turn, though, the policy ar-
guments disrupt the power of the stories themselves. Had the book
rehearsed the history of interracial intimacy through the use of narratives, it
would have been an interesting and informative read, raising questions re-
garding further research, examining the effects of interracial intimacy on
race, and providing lessons for, or comparisons to, interracial intimacies in
other racial pairings. Similarly, a book designed to expose interracial par-
enting and other relationships more fully could have explored a wider
range of, and more perspectives on, such relationships, including the ex-
periences of nannies"' and the birth parents of transracially adopted
children and foster children.
Moreover, Kennedy's approach is surprisingly narrow and shallow in
that he views only race, to the near total exclusion of class and gender."9
In this way, and through his race-neutral approach, he fails to appreciate
or communicate other social and governmental forces and material con-
ditions that contribute to racial injustice, produce different experiences,
117. See infra text accompanying notes 128-30, 134-47, 155-70,180-90,196-206.
118. Domestic work, including caring for children, has been primarily performed by
women of color for more privileged women. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriar-
chy in the Meaning of Motherhood, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 224, 235 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds.,
1995).
119. Even in the context of adult interracial intimacies, there is much literature re-
garding gender differences. E.g., Hill & Thomas, supra note 51; Margaret M. Porter &
Arline L. Bronzaft, Do the Future Plans of Educated Black Women Include Black Mates?, 64 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 162 (1995); Zebroski, supra note 48. Kennedy also addresses primarily Black
and White heterosexual relations, rather than other interracial heterosexual and same-sex
intimacies. Carving out several races or forms of sexuality may not be inherently problem-
atic, but addressing only race and not gender or class essentializes race as something
experienced without regard to gender or class.
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and contextualize the very notion of choice. The book treats the subjects
of the stories it tells as atomistic individuals who (a) make choices; and
(b) whose choices are constrained only by legal mandate or public and
internalized disapprobation. This treatment may fit adult relationships in
the private family law paradigm, but using this model for all family rela-
tions obscures the deep complexity of intimate associations and the
historical and current barriers to such associations, particularly for poor
women of color and their children. These mothers and children are at
great risk of being subject to the public family law paradigm, one that is
marked by the state's coercive control over, and intervention into, the
family.
Further, Kennedy's importation of the theme that adult interracial
intimacies produce positive political effects into the realm of parent-child
relations is problematic. It is true that the parent-child relationship is an
important political and personal site because parents create and transmit
values through their children, including those surrounding race.
Nevertheless, Kennedy's desire to eradicate racism through transracial
adoption is not private, neutral, or politically progressive, particularly
because Kennedy's primary interest in the parent-child relationship is the
adoption of Black children by White parents. In contrast to the
voluntariness of most adult-adult relationships, in the adoption context,
such intimate orderings frequently arise out of coercion, not freedom.
Kennedy's portrayal of adoption as a solution for parentless children masks
the coercive forces and institutional racism that are attendant to the removal
of children from their families of origin in the first place. Moreover, this
coercive removal supplants the creation of non-dominant family values
with dominant (White) families, thus creating and maintaining dominant
values while destroying the opportunity to maintain alternative values. In
this way, Kennedy's promotion of White transracial adoption of Black and
Indian children as a solution for racial injustice, like earlier iterations of
this "solution," '2 ° has eugenic connotations and masks the underlying
racial injustice.
Indeed, one of the analytic weaknesses of the book is its failure to
appreciate that racial assignment plays out differently in adult-adult
(horizontal) relationships and in adult-child (vertical) relationships.
Although both types of relationships are susceptible to state interference
(although as Kennedy notes, external limitations on horizontal relationships
are largely gone), the same personal choice does not exist in the two types
of relationships; whereas the horizontal involves voluntary relationships, the
120. See, e.g., Julie Berebitsky, Rescue a Child and Save the Nation: The Social Construc-
tion of Adoption in the Delineator, 1907-1911, in ADOPTION IN AMERIcA: HIsToRcIAL
PERSPECTIVES 124, 128 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002) (describing an adoption campaign urg-
ing native born, middle-class women, in an era of declining native-born, middle-class birth
rates and resulting fears of "race suicide," to adopt and transform the children of imin-
grants from southern and eastern Europe).
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vertical involves children who generally cannot lawfully or developmentally
choose the relationships.' 2' Moreover, in consensual adult relationships,
adults choose with whom to be intimate, whereas the distribution of
children involves additional considerations beyond choice. Kennedy's
disregard of this distinction has both experiential and political implications.
On an experiential level, race matters. As I will show below,
adoptees have complex identities based on belonging to both their fami-
lies of origin and adoption. They do not enter adoption as blank slates
with no history; nor does their race, despite its cultural contingence, fully
follow that of their adoptive parents. Transracial adoptees are often seen in
opposition to their place so that they carry their identity of origin in their
adoptive home, neighborhood, community, or country and carry their
identity of adoption outside their adoptive home, neighborhood, com-
munity, or country. The elimination of legal barriers to transracial
stepparent adoption can honor the family ties of adoptees, but the promo-
tion of interracial adoption for foster children is often built on erasing
those ties.
The distribution of children is a deeply political matter because of
the fundamental and important role of family in creating and maintaining
values.'22 That is, families play the structural role in our political system of
caring for and raising children through the inculcation of private values
and loyalties. Parents, as moral actors who define and create value, repro-
duce their values in and through rearing children in intimate associations
and diverse settings that prepare children for life as democratic citizens.'23
State intervention into the distribution of certain children (here Black)
thus has political and moral consequences.
In the remainder of this book review, I hope to illustrate some of
the richness and complexity of interracial intimacies when race, class,
gender, and the uniqueness of youth are considered, rather than neutral-
ized or ignored. I attend primarily to such considerations in the context
of transracial adoption where the experiences of adoptees are particularly
informative. Bringing these parts to the foreground should help illustrate
how Kennedy's shallow treatment of interracial intimacy ultimately com-
ports with an unfortunately longstanding and pervasive agenda to control
poor Black women and their children.' A deeper inquiry reveals that
121. Annette R.Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MIcH.J.L.
REFoRM 683, 699-703 (2001) [hereinafter Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Par-
enthood]. I take this terminology from Professor Katharine Baker who, in another context,
has distinguished intimate adult relationships as "horizontal" and adult-child relationships
as "vertical." Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy
By Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1523 (1998).
122. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 705-13.
123. Id. at 707-09, 784-85.
124. Like Kennedy, I address most of my remarks to Black women and children, but
other people of color may have similar experiences.
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Kennedy misapplies his critique of barriers to interracial marriage and
custody to transracial adoption of foster children because the former is
about protecting intimate relationships while the latter arises out of inter-
ference with such relationships.
A. Justice and Individual Choice
Kennedy's individualized approach to racial justice relies heavily on
choice, something the privileged can exercise, often at the expense of the
less privileged who are, in this case, Black parents and children. 2 ' His sup-
port of transracial adoption as an example of individual choice is
problematic for three primary reasons: (1) the child welfare system, unlike
the more private family law system governing marriage, divorce, and child
custody, is coercive for parents as well as children; (2) in the coercive child
welfare system, non-dominant families,12 6 particularly Black and Indian,
are disproportionately affected in part because of their race; and (3) foster
care and adoption involve children who cannot choose for themselves for
developmental and legal reasons.
Kennedy bases his story of interracial intimacies in the private fam-
ily law tradition that primarily involves working- and middle-class free
families in which adults choose their mates and make decisions on behalf
of their children. When the family dissolves, a court may make those pre-
viously private decisions but the universe of choices is generally about
how the child and the property will be divided between the parents.
Adoption, in this private system, involves stepparent and relative adoptions
and adoption of children "voluntarily" relinquished by their parents. 27
There are at least two other more public family law traditions in
which the state makes, or permits others to make, fundamental choices
about marriage and child rearing. '28 One, of course, involves the laws of
slavery. Under those laws, enslaved adults were not free to marry and they
125. For KennedyWhite prospective adoptive parents are the less privileged. See, e.g.,
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 398 ("Fear of ostracism, feelings of guilt, and a sense of self-
doubt are among the emotions that inhibit a wide array of people-especially [W]hites-
from forcefully responding to [B]lack critics of interracial adoption.").
126. By "non-dominant" I mean families, norms, races, and practices that diverge
from White, middle-class, nuclear family and other norms that provide the measure of
families, race, and culture. See Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra
note 121, at 780-81.
127. The voluntariness of parental relinquishment, which is beyond the scope of this
book review, is highly contested. See, e.g., RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS
(2001).
128. I use the term "public" to denote the public interference with family ordering,
through legislative, administrative, and judicial means, that, in particular, mandates removal
of children from their families of origin. I recognize that the more private family law is
also public in that law defines family, and judges may be involved with property and cus-
tody decisions.
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did not have the right to custody or control of their children: children
born to women slaves belonged to the master; and children born to free
women, fathered by enslaved men, belonged to the mother.129 The other
public family law tradition involves the child welfare system, with its roots
both in the English and American poor laws for mainly European-
American children, and post-Reconstruction-Era laws for Black children.
In the modern child welfare system and its antecedent systems, third par-
ties (generally the state) remove children from their parents to be placed
with "better" families or in "better" environments. 130
Interracial Intimacies does not distinguish between the private system
and the more public systems. Viewing interracial intimacies through this
more public family law reveals a different story about justice and individ-
ual choice than Interracial Intimacies presents. Using his chosen lens,
Kennedy seriously overestimates the amount of choice Black women had
over their own bodies during slavery and over the maintenance of their
families both historically and presently. Although it is possible that some
female slaves had a modicum of choice and even took pleasure in, or re-
sulting from, their sexual relationships with masters, Kennedy barely
problematizes these relationships (at least for female slaves), characterizing
them as coercive and only occasionally as "rape."' - ' It is difficult to imag-
ine how much choice female slaves had when they were not legal persons
and had few, if any, options with respect to acceding to sexual requests,
demands, or brute force. On the contrary, masters used rape "as a weapon
of terror and control"' 32 Moreover, enslaved mothers existed in a precari-
ous state in which they had little control over the physical, and had no
129. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 253 (noting an unmarried woman was the parent of
the child to whom she gave birth; men were fathers only through marriage).
130. For a brief discussion of these distinctions between family law systems and cita-
tion to fuller discussions, see Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra
note 121, at 771-72. Public family law systems also embrace needs based welfare for
mothers with dependant children in which the state monitors intimate choices regarding
adult relationships and child rearing. Id. at 769-70. But c. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private
Law of Race and Sex:An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REv. 221 (1999) (arguing that
the private law of intestate succession and testamentary transfers played a role in maintain-
ing racial hierarchy during slavery).
131. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
132. Bonnie Thornton Dill, Fictive Kin, Paper Sons, and Compadrazgo: Women of Color
and the Struggle for Family Survival, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY 149, 150-51
(Maxine Baca Zinn & Bonnie Thornton Dill eds., 1994). Kennedy does note that rape
was used "as a weapon of terror aimed at intimidating or punishing [B]lacks" during Re-
construction and wartime. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 178. Nevertheless, even during
slavery, Black-White adult intimacies occurred on more casual, less coercive social levels,
particularly between Black slaves and White servants. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, MANY THOU-
sANDs GONE: THE FIRST Two CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 44-45 (1998)
(noting expansive interracial intimacies between free Blacks and Whites and between
Black slaves and White servants in seventeenth century Chesapeake).
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legal, custody of their children and were subject to external control and
intervention in intimate family matters. 33
This surveillance and disruption of Black families continues today, al-
beit in less harsh forms, in both welfare and child welfare interventions.
1 3 4
Black children are removed from their families at twice the rate of White
children 3 ' and are represented in the foster care rolls about three-and-one-
half times more than they are in the general population. '36 The reasons for
this disparity are contested, particularly as to whether causes relate to racism
or poverty.3 Even if one is more likely to attribute racial disparity to the
individual pathologies of Black mothers and families, as Kennedy does,13
empirical evidence indicates that child welfare professionals view Black
families as less viable, less resourceful, and, consequently, in need of coercive
state intervention.1 39 Since assessment of the existence and severity of child
abuse and neglect is subjective, this view of Black families increases their
likelihood of being disrupted. 4 ° Moreover, poverty is often confused with
neglect, the predominant reason for protective intervention. Since Blacks
are disproportionately poor, their families are more vulnerable to being
labeled as neglectful."' Further increasing this race-based vulnerability is
the fact that poor families are both more visible to public agencies and
133. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 768.
Bonnie Thornton Dill provides a much less rosy and more complex picture of female
slaves' reproductive labor, as marked by "surveillance, assault, and ambivalence" due to the
enslaved family's role in socializing children into the slave system and the family as a place
for autonomy and creativity, all the while subject to the master's coercive interference. Dill,
supra note 132, at 151.
134. See Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 769-
79 (describing conditions of needs-based social security benefits and child welfare inter-
vention).
135. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 171,
172 (2003).
136. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 772.
White children, in contrast, are represented in foster care about half as much as they are in
the general population. Id.
137. Id. at 772-75. Of course, untangling racism from poverty is difficult. See Mi-
chael B. Katz, Reframing the Underclass Debate, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO PovERTY: THE
ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITIcs 59 (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings eds., 1999).
138. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Charles Murray, and William Pierce have done the
same. See infra text accompanying notes 223-30, 253-54.
139. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 773-75.
140. Id. at 773 n.383.
141. Id. at 772-73; Ruth G. McRoy et al., Achieving Same-Race Adoptive Placements for
African American Children: Culturally Sensitive Practice Approaches, 76 CHILD WELFARE 85, 87
(1997) [hereinafter McRoy et al., Achieving Same-Race Adoptive Placements for African Ameri-
can Children]. Child welfare experts estimate that most children in foster care could have
remained home, given appropriate assistance. See Guggenheim, supra note 72, at 1716,
1724-32 (rehearsing studies). Only ten percent of child welfare cases involve serious
abuse. Id. at 1724-25.
[VOL.. 9:421
Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children
more anonymous to their service providers, so they are more vulnerable
to state surveillance and intervention.1
42
Moreover, child welfare services, before or after placement, are fre-
quently not designed to meet the material needs of families of any race."'
Once Black families are involved in the child welfare system, they are less
likely to receive the assistance they need to fix whatever it is that brought
them to the attention of the authorities in the first place. Black families
are less likely to be offered preventive services; instead, their children are
more often placed in substitute care, even when they have the same char-
acteristics as White children not placed in substitute care.'44 Black families
also receive fewer services once their children are in care. In other words,
their case workers have less frequent contact with, offer fewer services to,
and arrange fewer family visits between, Black parents and children in
care. 145
Under any nuanced accounting, these mothers do not choose the
social and material conditions of their lives or to lose their children to the
state, and perhaps then to adoption. Nor do their children, generally,
choose to be placed in foster care, and perhaps then adopted. Children do
not have the power to determine their race or their parents. Adults make
those choices-whether those adults are birth parents, adoptive parents or,
in Kennedy's featured community, state child welfare bureaucrats.
Kennedy professes concern regarding the fate of these children in foster
care, lamenting their use as pawns of the NABSW, as if the children, given
a choice, would uniformly choose to be adopted transracially. This appeal
142. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class
in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577 (1997); see also Appell, Virtual
Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 773 nn.383-86 (rehearsing studies
showing that professionals are less likely to report children to child protection authorities
when professionals have a social relationship with the family and that race and socioeco-
nomic status unconsciously affect child abuse and neglect reporting).
143. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 775-77.
144. U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, NATIONAL STUDY
OF PROTECTIVE, PREVENTIVE AND REUNIFICATION SERVICES DELIVERED TO CHILDREN
AND THEIR FAMILIES xi-xiii (1997), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/
publications/97natstudy/natstudy.htm (final report presenting findings of 1994 study; see
also Issue Paper on Foster Care and Adoption, Foster Care Dynamics in Urban and Non-
Urban Counties 22 (Feb. 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/fostercare-
issues02/dynamics/index.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003) ("the likelihood of placement
among African Americans has been 3 to 4 times greater, although the differences grew
smaller over the course of the decade"); McRoy et al., Achieving Same-Race Adoptive Place-
mentsforAfrican American Children, supra note 141, at 87 ("In one state, one in 20 African
American infants born in one year were placed in out-of-home care, compared with one
in 100 Caucasian infants .). Note that Hispanic children were also more likely to be
placed in out-of-home care. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
supra, at xi-xiii.
145. McRoy et al., Achieving Same-Race Adoptive Placements for African American Chil-
dren, supra note 141, at 87.
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to the children's interests masks the adult role in assigning children to
families and the complexity of children's experiences of substitute care.
Individual children will ultimately decide-as teenagers and adults-
whether adults made good choices for them. But whether or not they
think they grew up in the correct family, whatever that is, will not
necessarily suppress their experience or interest in their birth heritage. '46
Kennedy's discussion of transracial adoption is firmly placed on the
backs of families that have been coercively disrupted by the state. Al-
though transracial adoption may be a choice on the part of the adoptive
parents, the children available for adoption have been coercively removed
and kept from their families and communities. This reveals a fundamental
irony in Kennedy's atomized approach to racial justice: particularly in the
context of transracial adoptions, the very fact that there are so many Black
children available for adoption is the product, arguably, of racial injus-
tice. 147
Kennedy's solution-transracial adoption-for foster children par-
ticularly and to promote racial justice more generally would be quaint if it
did not carry eugenic undertones in the context of American race rela-
tions and poverty. The promotion of coercive sterilization and birth
control for Black women, caps on the number of children in poor fami-
lies, disproportionate percentage of Black children in foster care, and the
powerful legacy of buying, breeding, and selling of Black slaves make such
a solution suspect.' 8 Moreover, advocating such an individualistic, status
quo solution to the problem of caring for children of "dysfunctional"
Black families disregards the complex relationships between poverty and
race 49 and assumes that racial justice is a matter of individual will.
For Kennedy, interracial intimacies are desirable and the ideological
critique of, or legal interference with, the formation or preservation of
those relationships are bad. But this is too simple. It is one thing to pro-
146. See PETER L. BENSON ET AL., GROWING UP ADOPTED: A PORTRAIT OF ADOLES-
CENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 26 (1994) (finding that sixty-five percent of adopted
adolescents would like to meet their birth parents); DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING
ADOPTED (1992) (exploring the importance of birth relations to identity formation of
adoptees).
147. See, e.g., ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE
STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE (1972); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
SHATTERED BoNDs:THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002); Martin Guggenheim, The Foster
Care Dilemma and "hat to Do About It: Is the Problem That Too Many Children Are Not Being
Adopted Out of Foster Care or That Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 141 (1999).
148. See SOLINGER, supra note 127, at 181-224 (describing how motherhood is a class
privilege in the United States); Ruth-Arlene W Howe, Transracial Adoption (TRA): Old
Prejudices and Discrimination Float under a New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 409, 419-20 n.48
(1997) (comparing transracial adoption to the commodification of child slaves).
149. For recent treatments of the issue, see, for example, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
POVERTY: THE ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings
eds., 1999).
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mote personal choice regarding intimate partners and children; it is an-
other to assume that it does not matter that the state has interfered with
private ordering of disproportionately large numbers of certain groups,
for example Blacks and Indians. In other words, viewing transracial adop-
tion as the solution both interferes with the attempts of non-dominant
families and their communities to maintain their own, and therefore, their
cultures, and impermissibly involves the state in making fundamental
choices better left to individuals.150
B. Individuals, Groups, and Identity
Just as Kennedy's view of individual choice is colored by his use of
just one family law paradigm, the private one, his view of adoption is
cramped because he fails to include the perspective of adoptees. As a re-
sult, he does not appreciate the psychological and social importance of
biological relations and heritage for adoptees. He thus dismisses the sig-
nificance of race and cultural competence in the transracial adoptive
family.
My aim here is not to join the rich debate regarding whether trans-
racial adoption is good or bad.151 This debate, like most issues surrounding
children and families, presents a question that is not universally resolvable
because the answer is based on one's ideas about race, racism, and where
Black children belong.5 2 Proponents of transracial adoption often point to
the best interests of the child and studies of transracial adoptees to
150. See Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 779-
87 (discussing the role of child rearing in the creation and preservation of values, particu-
larly in the context of coercive intervention into nondominant families).
151. There is a tremendous amount of empirical and theoretical literature in law and
the social sciences regarding the benefits and detriments of transracial adoption. E.g.,
FOGG-DAvIS, supra note 6; IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: CULTURE, IDENTITY AND
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (Ivor Gaber & Jane Aldridge eds., 1994); RUTH G. McRoy &
Louis A. ZURCHER, JR., TRANSRACIAL AND INRACIAL ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS
(1983); SANDRA PATTON, BIRTHMARKS: TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
(2000); RITA J. SIMON & HowARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE & IDENTITY: FROM INFANCY
TOYOUNG ADUL.THOOD (2d ed. 2002); R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: FulfllingAdop-
tive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE LJ. 875 (1998);
Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n, The Indian Child Welfare Act and the African American Tribe: Facing
the Adoption Crisis, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 201 (1997-98); Hawkins-Le6n & Bradley, supra
note 76; Howe, supra note 148; Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests
Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-91); Twila L. Perry, The Transracial
Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.YU. REV. U. & Soc.
CHANGE 33 (1993-94) [hereinafter Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy]. Kennedy
cites many of these works. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 584 n.1.
152. To mirror Kennedy, I refer primarily to White adoption of Black children.
Much of the analysis surrounding transracial adoption applies to White adoption of chil-
dren of other races including, international adoption.
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illustrate that such adoptees do just fine overall."5 3 Opponents, besides cri-
tiquing the studies, raise structural concerns about transracial adoption
based on its exploitative origins and, because most unrelated interracial
adoptions involve White adoptive parents and children of color, its com-
promise of children's identity formation and the culture of the child's
group."4 I do not intend to review these arguments or the studies here
but instead, to situate Kennedy's approach to transracial adoption in gen-
erally accepted principles about adoption.
Kennedy undervalues the complexity of identity for adoptees
through his attempt to annihilate racial categories and cultural expecta-
tions. Yet there is a great deal of rich empirical and theoretical research
that helps explain the importance of an adoptees' birth ties-including
race. '5 The notion that adoptees are blank slates reborn upon adoption is
woefully dated. More enlightened, current understanding regards
adoptees as forever parts of their birth and adoptive families." 6 One psy-
chologist describes the importance of birth connections as "a deeply felt
psychological and emotional need, a need for roots, for existential conti-
nuity, and for a sense of completeness.111 7 Child welfare and mental health
professionals regard birth connections as very important to identity for-
mation in adoptees.155 Knowledge about the birth family helps the
153. E.g., SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 151; McRoy et al., Achieving Same-Race
Adoptive Placements for African American Children, supra note 141. Most of the studies have
been criticized for being Eurocentric, confined to only a narrow set of behavioral, cogni-
tive, and emotional outcomes and containing methodological limitations. See Shelley M.
Park & Cheryl Evans Green, Is Transracial Adoption in the Best Interests of Ethnic Minority
Children?: Questions Concerning Legal and Scientific Interpretations of a Child's Best Interests,
3(4) ADOPTION Q. 5, 13-19 (2000); Jeffrey J. Haugaard, Research and Policy on Transracial
Adoption: Comments on Park and Green, 3(4) ADOPTION Q. 35, 35 (2000).
154. E.g., Howe, supra note 148; Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy, supra note
151.
155. For particularly thoughtful explorations of race and transracial adoption, see
FOGG-DAvIs, supra note 6 and PATTON, supra note 151. See also Barbara Yngvesson, Placing
the "Gift Child" in Transnational Adoption, 36 LAW & Soc'v REV. 227, 239 (2002) (arguing it
is the adoptive child's preexisting ties to a family, a history, a culture, not just their potential
for the future that distinguishes prospective adoptees from mere commodities).
156. E.g., BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 146, at 12-14; MiRIAM REITZ & KENNETH W
WATSON, ADOPTION AND THE FAMILY SYSTEM (1992); HJ. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in
Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BuT.J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133 (1964).
157. Fernando Colon, Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 FAM. PROCESS 289, 302
(1978); see also PATTON, supra note 151, at 1 (quoting a transracial adoptee: "to have a fam-
ily tree ... I had an idea of roots, that you had to be able to trace it biologically"). Although
not all adoptees may feel a need to connect with their birth history-their family, cultural,
race, or geographic origins, the vast majority of adoptees have such interest. BENSON Er
AL., supra note 146, at 26.
158. See BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 146, at 58-59, 63-64, 99-101; ALFRED
KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 494 (3d ed. 1980); Marianne Berry, Stress and Coping
Among Older Child Adoptive Families, 1 Soc. WORK & Soc. SC. PEV. 71, 74 (1989-90);
David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment, in THE PSYCHOL-
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adoptee form his or her image of self. It is this scientific knowledge re-
garding the importance of identity, in part, that supports professionals' calls
for continuity for adoptees and acquisition and retention of information
relating to the child and his or her roots.'59
Moreover, the Black foster children that Kennedy wants White peo-
ple to adopt are not infants. They are older, on average six years old,' 60
and are likely to have lived with their birth families and continued to have
visited them while in foster care.'6 ' The idea that these children may be
excised from their pasts and their pasts excised from their future is naive.
On the contrary, foster children have persistent psychic ties to their par-
ents. ' 62 They frequently express a continuing desire to visit their biological
parents and, in some cases, a desire to resume living with them. 63 In fact,
foster children may experience termination of parental rights and adop-
tion as unreasonable and unnatural. 64 It is not surprising then that a large
portion of adopted foster children maintain contact with their relatives or
prior caregivers. 6 1
Birth connections seem to be significant from a sociological per-
spective as well. People feel connected to their origin, their kin, and
OGY OF ADOPTION 3, 7 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990); Colon,
supra note 157; Harold D. Grotevant, Coming to Terms with Adoption: The Construction of
Identity from Adolescence into Adulthood, 1 ADOPTION Q. 3 (1997); Carl Schoenberg, On
Adoption and Identity, 53 CHILD WELFARE 549 (1974).
159. Indeed, international law reflects these values. See Nancy Heimerle, International
Law and Identity RightsforAdopted Children, 7(2) ADOPTION Q. (forthcoming 2003).
160. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES AS OF APRIL 2001(5) (2001), available at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/apr200l.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2004) [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT] (reporting that the mean age of children of all
races at the time of adoption is 6.9 years).
161. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collabo-
rative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1011-12 (1995) [hereinafter Appell,
Blending Families Through Adoption] (describing foster children's contacts and connections
with their families of origin).
162. Id. at 1014-16.
163. MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 137-
41 (1988).
164. Robert Borgman, The Consequences of Open and Closed Adoption for Older Chil-
dren, 61 CHILD WELFARE 217, 223-24 (1982); see also Robert Borgman, Antecedents and
Consequences of Parental Rights Termination for Abused and Neglected Children, 60 CHILD WEL-
FARE 391, 397-98 (1981) (describing foster children's enduring connections to siblings and
other relatives); Malcolm Bush & Harold Goldman, The Psychological Parenting and Perma-
nency Principles in Child Welfare: A Reappraisal and Critique, 52(2) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
223, 232 (1982) (describing foster children who opposed severing ties with their biologi-
cal families).
165. See KATHERINE A. NELSON, ON THE FRONTIER OF ADOPTION: A STUDY OF
SPECIAL-NEEDS ADOPTIVE FAMILIES 103 (1985) (reporting that foster-adoptees in forty-one
percent of families studied maintained contact with previous caretakers, including birth
relatives, after adoption).
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previous generations. These connections help define us.'66 The impor-
tance of biological connection reaches beyond individual parentage to the
cultures from which the parents (and their parents) came.16 In the context
of transracial adoption, it means that the adoptee will be in a culture that
is most likely different from the adoptee's culture of origin and the differ-
ence will be difficult to mask.168 Indeed, transracially adopted children
retain their race even, or perhaps especially, after adoption. '69 Their sense
of identity is particularly complex and contingent upon location. Thus, a
Black transracially adopted adoptee may be Black when with his or her
White parents but White when with certain other Blacks."' Viewing
transracial adoption solely through the lens of the adoptive family, as
Kennedy does, can obscure the facts that the adoptee is a member of at
least one other family-the birth family-and that both the adoptee and
birth parents suffer a loss upon adoption.1 7 1
Although not involving transracial adoption, the experience of racial
difference is vividly displayed in the story of June Cross that Kennedy
provides as an example of "blocked interracial parenting."7 Cross is a bi-
racial woman whose White mother, Norma Greve, placed her with a
Black couple early in Cross's childhood. Whenever Cross visited Greve
and her White actor husband, Larry Storch, they passed Cross off as their
166. For thoughtful discussions of identity in adoption, see Barry Richards, What is
Identity?, in IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: CULTURE, IDENTITY AND TRANSRAciAL
ADOPTION 77-88 (Ivor Gaber & Jane Aldridge eds., 1994). See also Cynthia B. Cohen, Parents
Anonymous, in NEw WAYS OF MAKING BABIES 88, 92 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996);Yngves-
son, supra note 155.
167. See PATTON, supra note 151, at 1-25.
168. Both the tranracial adoptee and others will most likely see the physical differences
between the adoptee and adoptive parents, so the fact that the child is adopted will be more
accessible. See generally McRoy & ZURCHER, supra note 151, at 127, 131 (comparing inracial
and transracial adoption of Black children).
169. SeeYngvesson, supra note 155, at 237 (arguing that in adoption "the child moves,
but 'Chineseness' 'American Indianness,' 'Koreanness,' or 'Colombianness' remains the same
(or rather, these qualities are enhanced and constituted anew as immutable in this move-
ment)").
170. See also McPoy & ZURCHER, supra note 151, at 139 ("transracial adoptees' [Wihite
peers viewed them as being different from their stereotypes of other Blacks"); PATRON, supra
note 151, at 13--14;Yngvesson, supra note 155, at 238-40, 248-52 (describing experiences of
transnationally adopted children whose identities shift depending on whether they are in
their country of origin or adoption; for example, one Korean adoptee noted she felt Korean
in Sweden and Swedish in Korea).
171. Many adoptive families recognize these complexities. See Appell, Blending Families
Through Adoption, supra note 161, at 998-1000, 1018-19; see also MARY LYNDON SHANLEY,
MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLoGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS ix-x, 38-39
(2001) (adoaptive mother expressing the complexity of adoption for adoptees); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?": Conceptualizing Children's Identity Rights in Tram-
racialAdoptions, 2 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107,116-20 (1995) (same).
172. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370-71.
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adopted daughter.'7 3 Kennedy reports Cross's painful childhood memory
of a shared bubble bath with her mother when Cross was seven or eight
years old. During the bath, Greve remarked that if Cross had not "'gotten
darker as [she] grew older,' " Greve could have kept her. 17 4 For Cross,
"'[t]hat moment is frozen in time: my mother's bamboo-colored skin, my
toffee-colored hand; her straight auburn hair, my tight [B]lack curls
. 7. 5 2,1  Although Kennedy seems to have included the anecdote to show
the injustice of Greve's self-serving internalization of social prohibitions
against interracial intimacy,'76 the story also illustrates the concreteness of
difference and identity. Transracial adoptees experience those moments of
difference sometimes as moments of loss-of separation from the birth
mother and of incomplete identity with the adoptive parent.7 7
C. A More Child-Centered Vision of Transracial Adoption
Adoptees' experiences of loss and difference do not mean intraracial
or interracial adoption or biracial parenting are bad. Instead, these experi-
ences reveal that adoptees are not blank slates and that they experience
their histories or cultures of origin on some level. These experiences
should be acknowledged, not disregarded. Nevertheless, I do share Ken-
nedy's post-modern, anti-essentialist doubts about training and assessing
pre-adoptive parents and assumptions that any Black parents will be better
than White parents. In light of our inability to predict the future, to know
who are the best parents, and to determine what or who is Black, such
prognostication is tricky. We may have ideas generally about what envi-
ronments are best for children and who can best parent, but these ideas
are indefinite, not universal, and of limited predictive value given how
easily circumstances can change due to illness, accident, divorce, jobless-
ness, or other unforeseen occurrences.' 78
This is not to say, however, that we cannot assess or evaluate at all.
Indeed, given the complexity of identity development especially for
adoptees, it seems obvious that adoptive parents should be prepared for
adoption so that they can better understand the child's developmental
173. Id. at 371.
174. Id. at 371 n.*.
175. Id.
176. For example, Kennedy asserts that placing Cross out and portraying her as an
adoptive, rather than birth, child "were choices that Norma Greve made." Id. Kennedy is tech-
nically correct, but one wonders how much "choice" Greve had as a single White mother of
a biracial daughter in the 1950s after fleeing with Cross from Cross's abusive father.
177. See BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 146, at 58-59, 63-64, 99-101 (describing trans-
racial adoptee awareness of difference from adoptive parents and communities).
178. See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the
Child:A False Dichotomy in the Context ofAdoption, 2 DuKIIJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63 (1995).
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needs related to adoption.179 Adoption creates a different kind of family
that is itself culturally different from birth families. 8 Scientific consensus
holds that this difference should be acknowledged, that a child's curiosity
about his or her origin and adoption should be fostered, not stifled. 81 It
seems irresponsible to let parents and children enter into and live in this
unique type of family under the pretense that it is just like a birth fam-
ily.82 Indeed, the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), the standard
bearer for child welfare and adoption practice, recommends that adoption
and child welfare agencies assess potential adopters to determine if they
will be able to meet these unique needs of an adoptive child.'83 Training is
particularly helpful for prospective adoptive parents of foster children."4
When adoptive parents prepare to receive a child of another race,
some additional evaluation and preparation, depending on the child
and adoptive parents, is important particularly because the
transracial adoptive parents are most likely to be members of the
dominant race-White-while their adopted children will be of a non-
dominant race. It is no wonder then that adoption professionals and
scholars seem to think that there is something to the notion of cultural
179. See BRODZNSKY Er AL., supra note 146 (explaining developmental needs and ex-
periences of adopted children).
180. See, e.g., REiTz & WATSON, supra note 156 (describing a view of, and approach to,
adoptive families as a unique type of family system).
181. Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for
Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 150, 175-77 (1999).
182. Of course it would be good if all parents came to parenting with special knowl-
edge of child needs and development, but adoptive families remain a non-dominant family
form (since most people have experienced the birth family) so the special features of adop-
tive families are not necessarily part of every day experience. It is estimated, however, "that
58% of Americans know someone who has been adopted, has adopted a child or has relin-
quished a child for adoption." The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Ovewmiew of
Adoption in the United States, at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004).
183. CHILD WELFARE LEAGuE OF AMERiCA, CWLA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR
ADOPTION SERVICES 5-7, §§ 1.14, 1.15, 1.22,4.3,4.4,4.15,5.2 (rev. ed. 2000).
184. Id. at % 4.14, 4.15, 4.22; see also Bibhuti K. Sar, Preparation for Adoptive Parenthood
with a Special-Needs Child: Role of Agency Preparation Tasks, 3(4) ADOPTION Q. 63, 63-65 (re-
hearsing types of preparation and studies of effect of preparation on adoptions). Transracial
adoptive parents too seem to agree. See, e.g., Maria Vidal de Haymes & Shirley Simon, Trans-
racial Adoption: Families Identify Issues and Needed Support Services, 82 CHILD WELFARE 251,266-
69 (2003) (rehearsing transracial adoptive parents' wishes and suggestions for better pre-
adoptive training regarding raising a child of a different (non-dominant) race).
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competence, assessment, and training,"' even if there is not clear
agreement as to precisely what that cultural competence would entail. 186
In any event, cultural competence is not the caricature that Kennedy
suggests. For transracial adoptive parents, it has been defined as "the trans-
formation of a particular set of attitudes, knowledge, and skills into the
ability to meet the children's unique racial and cultural needs."'1 87 It en-
compasses racial awareness, multicultural planning, and survival skills.
Racial awareness refers to understanding the construction and implica-
tions of one's own and one's child's race. This awareness should assist
transracial adoptive parents to recognize how their own cultural back-
ground influences the way they think and experience the world,
including an awareness of their own racial prejudice, how their child's race
may affect their treatment, and the value of their child's culture.' 8 Multi-
cultural planning refers to the importance of exposing the child to his or
her culture, members of that culture, and same culture role models."9 Fi-
nally, survival skills refer to the ability and willingness to work with the
child to help him or her recognize, understand, and respond to racism as
well as the development of support systems for the parents in understand-
ing and coping with racism directed at the child.' °
Cultural competence thus recognizes the construction of race in our
culture and how it affects individuals. This view makes clear that when
transracial adoptive parents come from a privileged race they will not
necessarily know what it is like not to have such privileged status."
Given the importance of birth relations to most adoptees, imagine how it
would be to live with transracial adoptive parents who are insensitive to
insults regarding the child's race or, worse, who despise or disrespect their
child's racial heritage.
Moreover, although Kennedy aptly raises questions about the
essentialist notions regarding race that are embedded in the transracial
adoption dialogue, he undervalues the lived experience of racial privilege
and subordination. In other words, Kennedy fails to acknowledge that
people and institutions essentialize race in that they engage stereotypes
185. See M. Elizabeth Vonk, Cultural Competence for Transracial Adoptive Parents, 46 Soc.
WORK 246, 246 (2001) (noting that supporters and critics of transracial adoption "strongly
recommend that (TRA) [transracial adoptee] parents need to acquire the attitudes, skills, and
knowledge that enable them to help their children develop positive racial identities and sur-
vival skills for life in a racist society").
186. Id. at 247 ("[Tlhere is no agreement or guide as to exactly which attitudes, skills,
and knowledge are needed by this group of parents to enhance their cultural competence.")
187. M. Elizabeth Vonk & Ruth Angaran, A Pilot Study of Training Adoptive Parents for
Cultural Competence, 4(4) ADoPTION Q. 5, 8 (2001) (citation omitted).
188. Vonk, supra note 185, at 249-50.
189. Id. at 251.
190. Id.; see also PATRON, supra note 151, at 62-98 (describing experiences regarding
racial identity of transracial adoptees raised by culturally sensitive and race blind families).
191. Vonk, supra note 185, at 250.
SPRING 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
and assumptions, often unconscious, when viewing Blacks and Whites.
Relatedly, Kennedy does not acknowledge that Blacks experience this
prejudice, this sense of being different from the dominant norm, despite
their middle- or upper-middle-class backgrounds. 92
To presume, as Kennedy does, that White transracial adoptive parents
will be conscious of their own privilege and what it means to live in a
White world as a person of color is naive. To presume that it is not im-
portant that parents understand their child's uniqueness, especially when
that child is an adoptee, reveals a lack of insight about parenting and
adoption. Indeed, some of the goals of cultural competency assessment
and training may be generalizeable to parenting any Black child. Thus,
teaching a child not to internalize racism and how to cope with racism
may be lessons all parents of children of color should learn.'93 Teaching an
adoptee about his or her heritage may not be a universal value, particu-
larly for someone like Kennedy who wishes to erase racial distinctions
and who is skeptical about the meaning or existence of Black culture.11
Nevertheless, the thought of how transracial adoptive parents who lack an
elementary understanding of the operation of race in our culture will re-
spond to their child's experiences of racism, or who tolerate racial slurs, is
chilling.
D. Adult-Centered Vision of Transracial Adoption
Kennedy's approach to, and arguments regarding, the foster care
problem belie his purported concern for children. The book omits
discussion about their stories, their narratives, 9 ' and the considerable
scientific literature regarding their developmental needs. This lack of
concern for children is also reflected in Kennedy's disinterest in supporting
these children in their communities. Instead, the book dehumanizes
children by failing to acknowledge that they have parents and disrespects
their communities, as if children are objects, somehow separate and
fungible. Like the NABSW he criticizes, Kennedy's agenda relates to the
socialization of children, but unlike the NABSW, Kennedy wants these
192. FOGG-DAvIS, supra note 6, at 14-33; PATTON, supra note 151, at 92.
193. Similarly, raising White children to be aware of their privilege and externaliza-
tion of that privilege is a valuable step toward a goal of racial equality.
194. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 444-46.
195. Even when he does include narratives of adult transracial adoptees, he discounts
those with which he does not agree. Id. at 17. Yet, he displays great concern for White
prospective adoptive parents and their entitlement to Black children. See, e.g., id. at 446 n.*
("The groveling posture that some candidates for adoptive parenthood assume in order to
win approval from child-welfare officials whom they perceive to be skeptical of their abil-
ity to raise children of a different race or religion or culture from their own is a
heartrending spectacle.").
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"parentless" children to grow up in communities different from the
children's origin.
Also indicative of an adult, rather than child-centered, agenda is the
absence of evidence that transracial adoption will even begin to solve the
problem of placing foster children in permanent homes or even that there
is significant resistance to transracial adoption now. Kennedy provides no
data to support his claim that transracial adoption will solve the foster care
problem. This is not surprising because no such data exist. Instead, what
data there are show insufficient transracial demand for adoption of Black
foster children.1 96 Part of this demand problem may be race-based, 97 but it
also relates to the overwhelming number of prospective adoptive parents
who desire to adopt young children and children free from disabilities."8
The bulk of the tens of thousands of Black foster children purportedly in
need of adoptive homes are older and have various emotional or other
disabilities. 9 9 The demand for adoption of children of any race decreases
as the children age.2 °
Moreover, prior to the enactment of federal laws mandating termi-
nation of parental rights and adoption of foster children," ' approximately
thirty percent of foster children (over 100,000) were placed with rela-
tives.112 These children, though technically under state supervision or in
foster care, are in what are statistically considered to be stable, healthy
196. Mark E. Courtney, The Politics and Realities of Transracial Adoption, 76 CHILD WEL-
FARE 749 (1997).
197. Id. at 755-58 (rehearsing studies and other data showing thatWhite prospective
adoptive parents prefer to and do seek White, international, or other children of color, but
noting that some of the studies are over twenty years old); Devon Brooks et al., Preferred
Characteristics of Children in Need of Adoption: Is there a Denand for Available Foster Children?,
76 Soc. SERv. REV. 575, 584-86 (2002) (study of adoptive parents showing they are less
enthusiastic about adopting Black children than children of other races). It appears that
public and child welfare professional opinion has become more accepting of transracial
adoption since the 1970s. Judy Fenster, Transracial Adoption in Black and White: A Survey of
Social Worker Attitudes, 5(4) ADOPTION Q. 33, 38-40 (2002).
198. Courtney, supra note 196, at 755.
199. See id.; Hawkins-Le6n & Bradley, supra note 76, at 1262. In 2000, there were
64,000 children in foster care without legal parents. AFCARS Report, supra note 160.
The previous year, 46,000 children were adopted. Id. Forty-three percent of those children
were Black; thirty-nine percent were White. Id.
200. Brooks et al., supra note 197, at 586; Courtney, supra note 196, at 755, 758-79.
The vast majority of prospective adoptive parents seek infants who are free from disability.
Brooks et al., supra note 197, at 586.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 248-50.
202. Courtney, supra note 196, at 760. Additionally, in New York and California, over
forty percent of dependant children were placed with relatives; and, in Illinois, over fifty-
nine percent of dependant children were placed with relatives. James P. Gleeson, Kinship
Care as a Child Wefare Service: The Policy Debate in an Era of Welfare Reform, 75 CHILD WEL-
FARE 419, 420 (1996); see also Susan L. Brooks, Kinship and Adoption, 5(3) ADOPTION Q. 55
(2002) (discussing prevalence of kinship care within and outside of the foster care system).
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placements." 3 These children are not in need of adoptive homes, and if
they were to be adopted, many would be adopted by their kin.2 4 Yet for-
mal adoption is traditionally counter to Black culture which for
generations has relied upon kinship care and informal adoption to raise
children whose birth parents are unable to provide the quality of home or
care that kin can. 200 State experiments promoting subsidized relative
guardianship, rather than foster care in which the state has legal custody,
have been uniformly successful in providing children with continuity, sta-
bility, and a greater sense of belonging.26 Yet, when revamping the federal
child welfare laws to achieve permanency for children in 1997, Congress
chose to privilege adoption and not to institutionalize these successful
kinship programs.2 7 Instead, strangers receive more assistance to care for
203. Brooks, supra note 202, at 58, 63; Courtney, supra note 196, at 760-61.
204. See Brooks, supra note 202, at 63 ("Relatives now adopt 60 percent of the foster
children in Illinois who are adopted out of foster care."); Mark E Testa et al., Permanency
Planning Options for Children in Formal Kinship Care, 75 CHILD WELFARE 451, 453 (1996)
(reporting on study finding that a sizeable fraction of relative foster parents were willing to
adopt their relative foster children).
205. Brooks, supra note 202, at 57; Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in
the Black Community: A Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1649,
1659-67 (1995). This is not to say that Blacks do not formally adopt. Nevertheless, adop-
tion and child welfare agencies have traditionally used White, middle-class norms for
adoptive parents, thus creating barriers to prospective adoptive parents who do not fit
those norms. Hawkins-Le6n & Bradley, supra note 76, at 1260-61; Sandra Patton-Imani,
Redefining the Ethics of Adoption, Race, Gender, and Class, 36 LAW & Soc'y REv. 813, 822
(2002).
206. Brooks, supra note 202, at 58; Mark F Testa, Subsidized Guardianship: Testing an
Idea Whose Time has Finally Come, 26 Soc. WORK RES. 145, 146, 155-56 (2002); see also
Margaret F Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter? Adoptions by Kin
Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 463-64 (2002) (finding that for Black children kinship care
resembles living with birth parents); Gleeson, supra note 202, at 430 ("Placements with
relatives have been less likely to disrupt and tend to last longer than nonrelative place-
ments. These placements have also resulted in lower rates of adoption and lower 'return
home' rates; however, they also result in lower reentry rates after reunification than ob-
served for nonrelative foster care placements.") (citation omitted).
207. See 65 Fed. Reg. 4020,4032-33 (Jan. 25, 2000). ASFA also prohibits states from
having less formulaic standards for relative foster homes. Id. at 4032. Instead, relatives must
meet the same standards as strangers, standards that are based on middle-class norms. See
Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes: The Need For A New Fund-
ing Scheme for Kinship Caregivers, 22 FoRDHA" URB. L.J. 907, 922-23 (1995).Thus relatives
who cannot meet those norms cannot receive the more generous foster care benefits; nor
can relatives who assume legal responsibility for their dependent kin through guardianship.
Thus, children in non-foster relative care will receive the more meager and restrictive
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families grants, Medicaid, and food stamps. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS. Er AL., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON KINSHIP FOSTER CARE
(June 2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/kinr2c00/index.htm (reporting on na-
tional kinship care provision). ASFA did make placement with relatives a permissible
reason for the State not to seek termination of parental rights and adoption. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(E)(i) (2000). In one study, thirty percent of children exempted from mandatory
termination of parental rights were with relatives. U.S. GEN. AccouNT. OFF., STATEs' EARLY
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children than do kin.2"8 Kennedy does not promote kinship care as a solu-
tion for foster children. Nor does he mention these federal policies, let
alone critique them for failing to meet the permanency needs of so many
foster children.
Despite the fact that studies do not reveal a significant, if any, unmet
demand for transracial adoption of Black foster children, but do show
good placement alternatives to adoption for these children, Kennedy
would have us believe that there are tens of thousands of prospective
adoptive White parents who are prevented from adopting Black children
by social workers and child welfare agencies. This conclusion is under-
standable, though unwarranted, if one looks only at the handful of stories
of vocal White foster and prospective adoptive parents from whom Black
children have been removed in hopes of finding a same race placement.
That is precisely the reason social science should inform policy and advo-
cacy.20° A handful of thwarted adoptive parents does not prove either that
there is huge demand for these older foster children or widespread oppo-
sition to transracial adoption. 210
Kennedy's failure to consider the parents, relatives, or communities
of these "parentless" children is symptomatic of viewing children in isola-
tion, or as separate, atomistic beings. This perspective not only
disconnects them from their families and communities, but it also obliter-
ates their parents. This cleansing of the children from their heritage
commodifies children so that they are much easier to transfer.21 1 Indeed,
EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT GAO/HEHS-00-1 13
(Dec. 1999).
208. Hawkins-Le6n & Bradley, supra note 76, at 1281-84.
209. See Miriam Reitz, Groundswell Change in Adoption Requires Anchoring by Research,
16 CHILD & ADOLESCENT Soc. WORK J. 327 (1999) (exploring existing and needed re-
search areas in adoption law and practice); see also Theodore J. Stein, The Adoption and Safe
Families Act: How Congress Overlooks Available Data and Ignores Systemic Obstacles in Its Pur-
suit of Political Goals, 25 CHILD. &YouTH SERV. REv. 669, 673-74, 678 (2003) (noting that
Congress relied on newspaper accounts and other individual stories, rather than scientific
data, when passing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111
Stat. 2115 (1997)).
210. Indeed, many Black foster children are placed in White homes. See Leslie Doty
Hollingsworth, Promoting Same-Race Adoption for Children of Color, 43 Soc. WORK 104
(1998) (citing study finding that only two thirds of Black foster children are placed in
Black foster homes, most of which were likely kinship placements). A recent survey of
over 300 social workers, most of whom do not practice in the foster care or adoption
areas, revealed that Black social workers on average had slightly negative views while
White workers had slightly positive views about transracial adoption; as a whole, neither
group was strongly opposed or strongly in favor of transracial adoption. Fenster, supra note
197, at 33.
211. See PATTON, supra note 151, at 35-43 (discussing instances in which adoption
agencies falsified non-identifying information regarding birth families to insure the chil-
dren's adoptability); Berebitsky, supra note 120, at 130-31; Cf SOLINGER, supra note 127, at
26, 127 (noting that in international adoption, children are portrayed as orphans as a
method to ease and enable transfer of children).
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although Kennedy bemoans the plight of foster children, his approach to
the problem, besides being narrow and ungrounded, is akin to the ap-
proach of those who want to make children more accessible for adults
seeking to adopt.212 Kennedy's clear allegiance is to the "discriminated
against"White prospective adoptive parents. He shares this allegiance with
transracial adoption advocate Elizabeth Bartholet,213 and a good many
politicians214 who want to transfer Black children from their families and
communities to "better" families and communities.
For example, Kennedy embraces a federal law that forbids any con-
sideration of race in placement and promotes the interests of prospective
adoptive parents over children or their families of origin. The Removal of
Barriers to Interethnic Adoption Act (IAA),211 for which Kennedy lob-
bied,216 forbids consideration of the child's or prospective adoptive parent's
race in placement and adoption and does not include reference to the
child's interests, 21 7 a step backwards in the adoption lexicon. Although
identification and assessment of the child's interests can be highly subjec-
tive, the inclusion of that standard in state adoption laws more than a
century ago helped transform adoption, at least symbolically, into a child-
oriented process. 21 ' The IAA, codified in portions of the federal funding
statute that governs public foster care and adoption-the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA)2 9-permits any aggrieved
individual to bring a federal lawsuit against the offending entity.220 Thus,
212. See Appel], Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 727-
32 (rehearsing those approaches, including the Uniform Adoption Act, § 2-408(e)-(O, 2-
409(e)-(O, 9 U.L.A. 60-63 (1999), and the Adoption and Safe Families Act).
213. See BARTHOLEr, supra note 72; Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Be-
long? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991).
214. See infra text accompanying notes 237-51.
215. Passed as Section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996., Pub. L.
No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. % 671, 674,
1996b (2000)).
216. FOGG-DAvis, supra note 6, at 10. Kennedy also worked with Clint Bolick (of the
conservative Institute for Justice) and Harvard Law Professors Elizabeth Bartholet and
Laurence Tribe in challenging race matching in adoption. Id. at 44.
217. Indeed, the IAA repealed its predecessor, the Multiethnic Placement Act, 42
U.S.C. § 5115a (1994), which permitted consideration of "cultural, ethnic, or racial back-
ground of the child and the capacity of the prospective foster or adoptive parents to meet
the needs of a child of this background" in determining the best interests of the child.
Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553(a)(2), 108 Stat. 3518,
4056-57 (1994).
218. See Annette R..Appell, Legal Intersections, 3(3) ADOPTION Q. 85, 88 (2000).
219. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3) (2000). This provision is in contrast to the unenforceabil-
ity of other crucial aspects of the AACWA, particularly the provision that requires
reasonable efforts to maintain children in their homes, return them home, or place them
for adoption when that is the goal. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (holding
that the "reasonable efforts" requirement of the AACWA were not enforceable in a private
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at least at the point of placement for adoption, the prospective parents'
interests dominate all other considerations of the child's interests.22 '
E. Race Neutrality and the Non-Neutral Adoption Agenda
What is particularly troubling about Kennedy's race neutral ap-
proach is that it aims at the parent-child relationship-the primary forum
for creating and transmitting moral meaning. Kennedy's approach is not
neutral both because race neutrality is not neutral and because Kennedy
promotes only a one-way movement of children-from Black to White.
He does not promote mutual exchange of Black and White children
among White and Black families, although it is unlikely that he would
oppose such exchange. His embrace of transracial adoption reflects a
White assimilationist vision of society that specifically reinforces White
middle-class hegemony through the adoption of non-assimilated Black
children by White people.2 22 The contours of his vision are further re-
vealed in his discussion of transracial adoption as the solution to the
problem of inadequate Black families and his choice to include sympa-
thetic narratives of White prospective adoptive parents and exclude
narratives of the Black parents who lost their children to the state.
Kennedy's description of these Black families and his solution to
their problems fits a "conservative narrative" of race and class223 that
characterizes poverty as a result of individual character flaws and poor
mothers as deviant, lazy, immoral, Black, and illegitimately dependant on
governmental resources.2 24 This narrative, like Kennedy's, is based on
cause of action). Thus, children and their parents cannot sue the state for failing to make
efforts to keep the family together or to reunify the family if the State removes the child.
However, thwarted adoptive parents and foster children can sue the State for taking ac-
count of race in making placement decisions.
221. See Hawkins-Le6n & Bradley, supra note 76, at 1248. Nevertheless, an adoption
court would have to, in theory, take the best interests of the child into consideration be-
cause most, if not all, adoption statutes use that as the ultimate standard for adoption.
222. See McRoy & ZURCHER, supra note 151, at 126-33 (describing a number of
Black transracial adoptees who identify more with White than Black people); PATTON,
supra note 151, 62-98 (discussing the range and complexity of racial identities among
Black transracial adoptees and that many feel they have little knowledge or experience of
Black culture and some even identify as White). But see SIMON &ALTsTEIN, supra note 151,
at 222 ("Black adoptees stressed their comfort with their Black identity and their aware-
ness that they may speak, dress and have different tastes in music than inner-city Blacks-
but that the Black experience is a varied one in this society, and they are not less Black
than are children of the ghetto.").
223. See Bonnie Thornton Dill et al., Race, Family Values, and Welfare Reform, in A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO POvERTY:THE ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICs 263, 265-66 (Louis
Kushnick & James Jennings eds., 1999).
224. Id.;see also PATTON, supra note 151,at 177.
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assumptions "of Black family 'pathology.' ",225 Black families have long
been labeled pathological largely, at least in more recent times, due to a
matriarchal family system.2 6 Thus part of the concern about Black
families is the actual or perceived lack of patriarchal control over women
and children. Children raised without proper socialization are seen as the
problem that creates and maintains the underclass. 227 The Moynihan
Report of 1965228 found that Black matriarchal families are pathological.
229
Charles Murray also pegged the entire cause of Black inner city poverty
to "illegitimacy"-Black single mothers who, according to Murray, have
low IQs and are unable to properly socialize Black boys. Murray's solution
to this pathology, like that of Kennedy, is adoption.
23
Although Kennedy does not adopt the same language about poor
Black families as Moynihan and Murray, the book's treatment of these
families connotes the same ideas. First, Kennedy barely mentions these
families. This failure to say anything about them beyond sweeping gener-
alizations amounts to a similar dehumanization. 231 Second, his refusal to
225. Dill et al., supra note 223, at 266. This narrative about poor families is certainly
not new. In the context of child welfare and adoption, the narrative is reflected in the
notion of protecting society by transferring children from poor (often immigrant) families
to proper Protestant middle-class families. See LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POV-
ERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
(1989) (describing long history of U.S. efforts to rescue poor children from their families);
see also Patricia S. Hart, A Nation's Need for Adoption and Competing Realities, in ADOPTION
IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 140, 146 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002) (in the late
1800s and early 1900s, adoption was "proposed ... as an inoculation against the creation of
a permanent criminal or alien underclass").
226. See Dill et al., supra note 223, at 272.
227. See id. at 277; Patton-Imani, supra note 205, at 826.
228. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, THE NE-
GRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
229. Dill et al., supra note 223, at 272.
230. Id. at 277, 279-80 (discussing the infamous book by Charles Murray & Richard
J. Herrnstein, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE
(1994)).
231. For example, this is the extent of Kennedy's regard for these families:
This pool of parentless children is a tragic consequence of the personal catas-
trophes and social failures that kill parents, or maim them, or otherwise
render them unfit to carry out their parental responsibilities. Among the
gravest threats in this regard are disease, murder, child abuse, abandonment,
drug addiction, imprisonment, and poverty. A disproportionately large per-
centage of parentless children are [B]lack. This is not a statistical accident;
rather, it stems from a long and bitter history of slavery, segregation, and ra-
cially selective neglect and mistreatment.
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 402. Ironically, Kennedy bristles against claims that there is such
a thing as "[B]lack culture," id. at 444-46, or that Blacks are any better suited, by virtue of
their Blackness, to understand and respond positively to racism yet he freely invokes
sweeping generalizations about impoverished Black families, id. at 406.
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acknowledge that there are parents in these families-that is, his repeated
referral to "parentless children"--suggests that these families are illegiti-
mate; and, the children are filius nullius, 232 the archaic notion that children
born out of wedlock are the children of no one. The conservative narra-
tive also views Black single parent families as illegitimate. Third,
Kennedy's solution is both individual and addressed only to the children.
That is, his solution is to have the children adopted, not to help their
families and communities of origin. Indeed, his goal appears to be the
removal of poor Black children from their communities. This is evident
in his failure to address kinship care and his suggestion that poor foster
parents "are little better and sometimes worse than their homes of origin"
because they are poor and come from violent, drug-saturated communi-
ties with poor schools. 233
This conservative narrative was used to justify a range of federal
needs-based welfare and child welfare reforms in the 1990s that under-
mined the health and integrity of poor families, who are disproportionately
of color. These reforms, described below, 234 limit support for the most vul-
nerable families and actively promote transfer of their children to more
conventional families. This trend is directed at poor Black communities.2
3
1
Although race is not always mentioned explicitly in the discourse, as it is in
the promotion of transracial adoption, poverty, the so-called underclass,
single mothers, and welfare recipients are reflexively linked to Blacks.236
The first of these reforms was the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) that in 1996, replaced the
Aid to Families with Dependant Children entitlement program with the
time-limited block-grant Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program (TANF).3 7 With PRWORA, aid directed to individual poor
families with children-never adequately funded to remove families from
poverty23-became less assistive. PRWORA inserted time limitations for
receipt of assistance, mandated mothers to work outside of the home,
permitted states to establish family caps and imposed other conditions to
receipt of aid.2 39 These and other PRWORA limitations will further limit
232. This is the Latin term for the child (son) of nobody.
233. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 406.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 237-56.
235. Dill et al., supra note 223, at 277.
236. PATTON, supra note 151, at 177.
237. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
238. See Joel F Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of Enti-
tlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72
DENv. U. L. REv. 931 (1995).
239. For a description of the TANF provisions, see Tonya L. Brito, The Wefarization of
Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229 (2000) and Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E.
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the ability of poor mothers to obtain federal and state funding for poverty
relief and childcare.2 4° This result is no accident. On the contrary,
conservative equation of single parenthood with the cause of poverty,
crime, drugs, and illiteracy was a driving force in the 1996 welfare
reform.24' The connection could not be clearer: reduce assistance for poor
Black mothers to discourage them from giving birth.21 2
That same year, Congress enacted tax credits for adoptive parents243
and the IAA, thereby further promoting transracial adoption by outlawing
consideration of race in child placement and providing a private remedy
for prospective White adoptive parents who are not able to adopt a Black
child. 4 ' These laws were clearly connected to the ideology of welfare re-
form. Accompanying this legislation was a discourse regarding "Black
family pathology and White 'family values ",245 In fact, the IAA was ini-
tially part of the PRWORA in the section designed to reduce nonmarital
births.246 The explicit connection between the IAA and PRWORA was to
promote adoption by White middle-class families of the children poor
mothers could not afford to raise once their benefits were terminated.2 47
The next year, in 1997, Congress changed federal child welfare pol-
icy to all but forsake its slender promotion of family preservation and
reunification for abused and neglected children. Instead, the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)14' establishes a strong presumption that
Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families in the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REv. 386, 394-
99 (2002).
240. Peggy Billings et al., 4hat Do We Know About the Relationship between Public Wel-
fare and Child Welfare?, 25 CHILD. & YoUTH SERVS. REV. 633, 643-47 (2003); Leroy H.
Pelton, Welfare Discrimination and Child Welfare, 60 OHIo ST. LJ. 1479, 1481-82 (1999).
241. PATTON, supra note 151, at 159-65.
242. See id. at 163-64 (citing arguments that stopping state aid will discourage
women from bearing children outside of marriage); Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Re-
production, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 403 (1996) (arguing that family caps send the "message
that an important and legitimate way to end poverty is to end procreation by poor peo-
ple").
243. Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755,
1903-04 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §5 671,674, 1996b (2000)).
244. Small Business Job Protection Act 5 1808; see supra text accompanying notes
219-21.
245. PATTON, supra note 151, at 143; see also id. at 140-44 (describing discussions
regarding promotion of transracial adoption around this time). Patton also compares the
cries of reverse discrimination from White adoptive parents and their supporters with the
anti-affirmative action discourse. Id. at 143-44.
246. Id. at 161.
247. Id. at 164 (citing Charles Murray); see also id. at 166 (citing portions of the The
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, in which Richard J. Herrnstein
and Charles Murray promote adoption as a way to improve the IQs of poor children and
"one of the only affordable and successful ways known to improve the life chances of
disadvantaged children appreciably").
248. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
[VOL. 9:421
Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children
dependant children should be adopted if they cannot be returned to their
parents within a little over a year. 29 ASFA limited funding and time for
family preservation and reunification while paying states bonuses for the
adoption of children and providing additional funding for adoption pro-
motion and preservation.5 ASFA did not provide funding or solutions
for the well-known barriers to family preservation and reunification, such
as poverty, homelessness, substance abuse, and child care; nor did ASFA
address the underlying conditions that contribute to the designation of
children as abused or neglected. 21
These significant changes in federal, and therefore state, policies re-
garding poor families are symptomatic of viewing poverty as a matter of
personal failure or inadequacy, poor families as pathological, and poor
children as detached, and entitled to assistance only when removed from
their mothers and communities and placed with privileged families. Chil-
dren's value thus depends upon with whom they live. Away from their
communities of origin, the children's caregivers receive higher levels of
assistance through foster care and adoption subsidy payments. These poli-
cies reveal that our political leaders are seeking individualized solutions to
poverty and child maltreatment, hoping to hold single mothers account-
able and to transfer the children from those mothers who do not measure
up to mothers who do.252 Moreover, these policies barely mask a devalua-
tion of Black children and a desire to limit Black child bearing and
rearing.
Through these policies, adoption has thus become a major weapon
in the war on poverty. Recently deceased conservative lobbyist William
Pierce, head of the National Council for Adoption, an organization
Kennedy cites approvingly,' 3 made the connection, its scope and misog-
yny clear: "If we had an adoption system that worked in this country, we
249. See 42 U.S.C. 5 675(5)(E) (requiring states to file or join in petitions to termi-
nate parental rights of children in foster care for fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two
months). For discussion regarding the impossibility for many parents to obtain needed
services during this time period, see Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood,
supra note 121, at 774-77.
250. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 629a(a)(7)(A) (time-limited family reunification services),
629a(a)(8) (adoption promotion and support services), 673b (adoption incentive payments
and technical assistance for terminating parental rights and for adoption) (2000). States
may, and do, use these adoption promotion and incentive payments to hire additional staff
to terminate parental rights. U.S. GEN. AccouNT. OFF., FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION
HELPS STATES Focus ON FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING
BARRIERS REMAIN GAO-02-585 35 (June 2002).
251. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 772-77;
Guggenheim, supra note 147; Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The
Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 112 (1999). As noted
above, ASFA did not bolster extended families. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying
text.
252. PATTON, supra note 151, at 23; SOLINGER, supra note 127, at 191.
253. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 397 n.*.
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would have hundreds of thousands of babies that would be placed with
capable couples. They wouldn't be raised by young, poorly educated, un-
employed young women.""4 In this new war on poverty, Congress
imposes family caps on assistance to needy families while entertaining
funding and policies that support and promote adoption and infertility
treatments for middle-class women25 and make it easier to terminate pa-
rental rights of poor women. These political actions present an especially
chilling juxtaposition of value based on class and race.2 16
Interracial Intimacies fits neatly into this trend. The book presents the
stories of a handful of Black children who are removed from White foster
parents or who are purportedly kept from White parents, while failing to
cast its view on the thousands of Black and other families whom the state
has separated. Kennedy sympathizes with the White foster parents and
would-be adoptive parents who face actual or perceived barriers to
adopting Black children while he paints the parents of these children as so
worthless that they are not even parents.
If one takes a more critical view of race, then the picture is not one
of pathological families or parentless children, but of complex systems of
racial and class hierarchies, promoted and maintained by our political and
economic systems. Moreover, social scientists recognize that family struc-
tures have changed nationally and internationally such that the
paradigmatic nuclear family with the male breadwinner and the stay at
home wife/mother has declined due to diminishing wages and the labor
market.2" Social scientists attribute changes in family to economic and
class structure changes rather than individual or group characteristics.2 8
Our deep history of racism has effectively excluded Blacks from jobs,
marginalized them in the labor force, and, with the decline of industriali-
zation, cabined large numbers of them in inner cities. 219 Although there
are real correlations between race, single parent households, and poverty,
the question of the direction of those correlatives distinguishes those who
254. SOLINGER, supra note 127, at 271 n.39 (1987 oral testimony by William Pierce
before U.S. Congress).
255. Id. at 200-07.
256. Similarly, Black children's value depends on the race of their parents. That is,
poor Black children are of little value when with their birth families. See McClain, supra
note 242, at 403. These children do, however, become valuable when they are sought by
White parents. Moreover, Black foster children carry with them (until they are adults)
adoption subsidies that are higher than more restrictive TANF grants they would receive if
they remained in their mother's care.
257. Dill et al., supra note 223, at 267-68.
258. Id. at 268.
259. Katz, supra note 137. The story is more complicated than this, of course, and
includes, inter al., specific racialized policies by federal and state governments, including
urban renewal, redlining, and selective governmental laissez-fare. Id.; see also Russell, supra
note 6 (exploring the structural roles of race and class in social policy).
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view White supremacy as part of the natural order and those who view
White supremacy as part of the political order.
Kennedy's dismissive attitude regarding racial difference and cultural
competence and embrace of IAA's ban of any consideration of race in
adoptive placements is particularly troubling in a pluralistic liberal democ-
racy in which disproportionate number of Black children are removed
from their Black families and communities. McRoy and Zurcher's study
of transracial adoptions of Black children revealed that Black children
who were raised in predominantly White neighborhoods by adoptive par-
ents who took a neutral view of their own child's race, and a negative
view of other Black people's race, avoided Blacks and did not identify as
Black.26 ° Although this phenomenon may reduce racial distinctions and is
certainly one Kennedy promotes, achieving this result through coercive
governmental removal of children from Black families and placement in
White families amounts to social engineering on a level that is not consis-
tent with basic liberal principles regarding the relationship between
family, the State, and the propagation of moral value.
26
1
The parent-child relationship is a fundamentally important one in a
democracy such as ours in which individuals, not the state, determine
morality within a liberal framework. It is through our children that we
create and maintain value. 262 Although our society has not evolved to the
point of maximizing the conditions, and minimizing the barriers, for all
families to thrive, it is inconsistent with long-standing divisions between
state and family to call for large scale government-sponsored transfer of
children from underprivileged communities to privileged ones. State
placement of children based on competing norms regarding "the good
life" offends fundamental constitutional principles, particularly since the
addition of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.263 It should be
unthinkable for the state to try to improve society by enacting and exe-
cuting policies that transfer Black children to White parents. It is one
thing to assess, and disagree about, the best interests of individual children,
260. McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 151, at 139 ("Many of the transracial adoptive
parents exhibited stereotypical role expectations and perceptions of [B]lacks ... [and] were
apprehensive about the adoptee's association with other Black children and about the
family's living in a racially mixed neighborhood.")
261. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121, at 705-13,
782-86.
262. Id. at 705-13; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04
(1977) ("It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cher-
ished values, moral and cultural.").
263. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES (1997); Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, supra note 121; see also
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) ("[Clertain kinds of per-
sonal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act
as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.").
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but it is quite another to advocate a broad, macro policy that poor Black
children are best served when coercively removed from their parents264
and placed with White parents.
The demonization and devaluation of non-dominant mothers is not
new.2 6s Since adoption joined our lexicon, it has been used as a weapon to
control the sexuality of various groups of women2 6  and a tool to manage
marginalized communities, such as immrigrants, 267 Indians,2 6' and now
Blacks. At best, adoption is an important child welfare service for children
whose parents truly cannot or will not raise them. At its most neutral,
adoption offers a feel-good mechanism to avoid making any meaningful
social change. At its worst, for radical conservatives like Murray, adoption
is a tool for social engineering ("social eugenics")2 69 designed to destroy
the ability of Black women to bear and rear children. 211 In any event,
rather than providing the conditions for non-dominant communities to
thrive economically and socially, the adoption solution amputates children
from their families and communities and transplants them to families and
communities that can provide more resources and more acceptable val-
ues.
27 1
CONCLUSION
The mantle of rescuing children is not new. This rescue theme has
pervaded many approaches to the needs of poor children in this country
and internationally. This theme views family problems and solutions as
individualized and disconnects children from their families and commum-
ties rather than supporting the children in their communities. This
perspective is inherently hegemonic because it works one way: from
264. I realize that not all transracial or other adoptions involve state action or coer-
cion, in a legal sense, but many women who relinquish their children for adoption do so
primarily because they lack financial means to raise the child on their own. See SOLINGER,
supra note 127, for an insightful and comprehensive study of the relationship between class,
race, and reproductive choice.
265. See PATTON, supra note 151, at 145-46; Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of
Parenthood, supra note 121, at 766-71; Dill et al., supra note 223, at 278-80; Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 CoLuM.J. GENDER & L. 141 (1995).
266. See RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZIE (2nd ed. 2000); SOLINGER, supra
note 127.
267. See Berebitsky, supra note 120; Hart, supra note 225.
268. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understanding of State Court Resistence, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 602 (2002); Lorie M. Gra-
ham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine,
23 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 10-18 (1998).
269. PATTON, supra note 151,at 164.
270. See id. at 163-65 (rehearsing current calls to remove children from poor mothers
and earlier eugenic movements aimed at poor women and immigrants).
271. Id. at 158-67.
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dominant culture to non-dominant culture, destroying children's ties to
their parents, communities, and culture, and replacing them with ties to
those who embody or embrace more dominant norms.
One can blame personal weakness or pathology for the problems of
poverty. This position views society as a place where the strong survive
and the weak should not. Those who do not thrive sacrifice their chil-
dren to better parents, thus breaking the cycle of personal pathology and
poverty. Here, racial freedom is achieved through individual transforma-
tions of members of non-dominant cultures until those cultures expire.
Alternatively, one can view the problem as a society that has developed
and maintained huge geographic, economic, and racial barriers to social
movement. This view values cultural diversity and recognizes that most
people remain on whichever side of the barrier they are born. Those
who cross those barriers, up or down, are the exception. One can further
see those barriers as unfair, part of an unnecessary zero-sum game. This
view aspires to a vision of racial justice that removes these barriers and
creates the social, economic, and geographic conditions that permit all
children to thrive in their communities so that the communities and mul-
tiple cultures can flourish and as adults, children will have unfettered
choice. I choose this latter vision and approach to racial justice; Kennedy
apparently chooses the former.
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